D 511 
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JEARCH-LIGHTS 
ON THE WAR 



BY 

DR. BERNHARD DERNBURG 

Former Colonial Secretary of the German Empire 



GERMANY AND ENGLAND— THE REAL ISSUE 
ENGLAND'S SHARE OF GUILT 

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ENGLISH "WHITE BOOK" 

GERMANY AND THE POWERS 

THE TIES THAT BIND AMERICA AND GERMANY 

GERMANY'S FOOD SUPPLY 

WHEN GERMANY WINS 



by 
Lib. 



SEARCH-LIGHTS 
ON THE WAR 



BY 

DR. b]:rnhard dernburc; 

I^)mu-r Colonial Secretary of the GeriTian Emfiire 



GERMANY AND ENGLAND — THE REAL ISSUE 

ENGLAND'S SHARE OF GUILT 

A Ckiticai, Analysis of the English "White Book" 

GERMANY AND THE POWERS 

THE TIES THAT BIND AMERICA AND GERMANY 

GERMANY'S FOOD SUPPLY 

WHEN GERMANY WINS 



NEW \' O R K 

The Fatherland Corporation 

1123 broadway 

1915 






Transferred from 
Ubrariar)'s Offlea,' 



GERMANY AND ENGLAND THE REAL ISSUE 

{Fro?n "The Saturday Evening Post") 

As everybody knows, the trouble that led to the present world- war 
started in a little corner in the southeast of Europe, and it is remarkable t') 
see how, in spite of this common knowledge, in the eyes of the world the 
European conflict has resolved itself into a question between German}- 
and England as to supremacy in Europe. Of course England claims that 
she went to war on account of the breach of Belgian neutralit}' and that 
she must fight to destroy the spirit of militarism that has led to such a 
flagrant disregard of solemn treaties, a tendency that is endangering the 
peace of the world and consequently must be crushed entirely. While 
England fosters no ill feeling whatsoever and no antagonism toward the 
good people of Germany, unfortunately, in order to crush militarism, led 
by the Emperor and the military caste, the German people will have to 
be destroyed as a nation, reducing what is left to the size of a subordinate 
Power. For this purpose England has created in her literary arsenal a 
special docket called German Militarism, with the works of Von Bernhardi, 
Treitschke, and Nietzsche as the main exhibits. 

How Germany Has Kept the Peace 

It is interesting to note the number of copies of the books of these three 
men that were sold in America before the beginning of the war. I dare say 
there were not twenty of the works of any one of them in the hands of 
Americans, outside of clubs and public libraries. Von Bernhardi is the 
chief witness for the prosecution. He is a retired German general of great 
learning, independent views, and strong personality. His book makes 
interesting reading. Yet he is not among the German generals in the 
present war, having been retired from the service just because his writings 
and sayings did not meet with the aporoxal of his superiors and because his 
teachings were considered very extravagant. His book has excited some 
comment also in Germany, but it has been printed in only two editions, 
and certainly never more than ten thousand copies in all have been sold in 
our country. The book appeared in 191 1, a Httle over two and a half years 
ago, and I fail to see how it can hav^e created the feeling of militarism that 
is said to have been predominant in Germany for the last thirty years. I 
further fail to see how a book that is obviously written to warn the German 
people against existing dangers; to rouse in them a warlike spirit; to teach 

3 



4 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

them the ethics of war and the rights of the stronger, can be used tp prove 
that such a spirit of war was rampant in Germany. If it already existed, 
there was no need to write such a book! 

There are Von Bernhardis in all countries. I refrain from citing Ameri- 
can examples, because I have made it a rule in this country not to fall 
back on them. The feeling of obligation I have as a guest of the United 
States does not permit me to become personal. But what about Lord 
Charles Beresford, who, together with Captain Faber, has for years and 
years been egging on the Enghsh to increase the British Navy, at a great 
sacrifice to the country? What about Lord Roberts's writings and sayings 
for years back that England must have universal conscription and a com- 
pulsory ser\dce? What about Senator Humbert, who has vigorously 
denounced the French ministry for neglecting the defense of the country? 
Did they teach anything different from Von Bernhardi's teachings? I 
cannot see it. 

Then about Treitschke. He was a professor of history and the historian 
of the Prussian Go^•ernment. His ideas were formed from a hfelong study 
of this histor>'. He hated England sincerely and thoroughly for the way 
in which she had conquered her Empire, by using might versus right; but 
his conferences were mainly attended on account of his refined rhetoric, 
for he was indeed an orator of the first order. But from being an orator 
to having an influence on the German people as a whole is a very far cry, 
and Treitschke 's preachings of twenty years ago have not even formed 
a school. You might just as well say that it can be proven that America 
is a warlike nation because a celebrated Harvard professor at a later day 
impressed upon his women audience to go into war and help the Allies. 
If that were presented to the world as a proof of the American, spirit there 
would be a very energetic protest. 

And now I come to Nietzsche: He was one of the finest of poetical 
philosophers, or perhaps rather a philosophizing poet. His teaching of 
the right of the indi\'idual as the basis of all right is in direct contradiction 
to \^on Bernhardi's teaching that the right of the collectivity — that is, of 
the State — is paramount to the right of the citizen as an individual. How, 
therefore, can it be said that Von Bernhardi is a disciple of Nietzsche? 

The expression ''superman" is universally attributed to Nietzsche. 
This is just as incorrect as it is to cite the German song " Deutschland, 
Deutschland Ueber Alles" as a pr.Oof;of the world-wide aspirations of my 
people. Superman, in German Uel>'e'r'mensch, is a word coined by Goethe 
and used repeatedly in his '* Faust," and so one might just as well lay the 
present war to the door of Goethe. 

The absurdity of the thing is patent, and those who cite " Deutschlana, 
Deutschland Ueber Alles" in proof of German aspirations do not know even 
the first fines of this song so dear to the Germans. It is a song of modesty 
and shows better the tendencies of the German nation than anything else 
could: 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 5 

Germany, Germany above ever> thing, above everything in the world. 
May her sons ever stand united for defense and protection 

From the Maas unto the Memel, 

From the Etsch unto the Belt, 
Germany, Germany abo\e everything, above everything in the world. 

Now the Maas is part of the western frontier of my home country and 
the MemcI part of the eastern frontier, and so are the Etsch in the south 
and the Belt in the north. Could a patriotic song be more modest? You 
may compare it with your own saying that the United States is the finest 
country in the world. The meaning is the same. Everybody praises his 
country and loves it best. And is "Rule Britannia" without aspiration, 
without pretensions? 

And just as our national anthem is cited, so is our militarism. It has 
been created as a dire necessity for the defense of our four frontiers and has 
never been used beyond them. If every country could stand on so good a 
record as Germany there would not be so much cant about the reasons for 
the present war. It has been stated that miUtarism in general is a threat 
to the peace of the world. Yet German militarism has kept the peace for 
forty-four years. While Russia went to war with Turkey and China, and, 
after having promoted The Hague Conference, battled with Japan, and 
''protected" Persia, conquering territory double the size of the United 
States on the might-is-right principle; while England, the defender of the 
rights of the small States, smashed the Boer Republics, took Eg}'pt,C>'prus, 
and south Persia; while the French Republic conquered the Sudan, Tunis, 
Madagascar, Indo-China, and Morocco; while Italy possessed itself of 
Tripoli and the islands in the /Egean Sea; while Japan fought China, took 
Formosa, Korea, and southern Manchuria, and has now with the aid of her 
allies invaded China, a neutral country — there^ is not one annexation or 
increase of territory to the charge of Germany. She has waged no war of 
any kind, has never acquired a territory in all her existence except by treaty 
and with the consent of the rest of the world. 

The Battle-Ground of All Europe 

But why, then, did she keep up such a tremendous army? Certainly 
not for aggressive puq)oses. She never was aggressive toward anybody. 
She needed this army because her exposed situation in the middle of Europe, 
without natural boundaries, between unsettled neighbors, has made her for 
ages and centuries the cockpit and the battle-ground of all Europe. Her 
soil was drenched with blood and her population nearly exterminated in 
the Thirty Years' War; Louis XIV. in the Palatinate left hardly one stone 
on the other, destroyed old Heidelberg and took Alsace and Lorraiile, then 
a German-speaking dukedom; the devastations of the Seven Years' War, 
the battles and six years' occupation of the Napoleonic times, all taught 
Germany bitter lessons. Her soil has been the rendezvous of Swedes. 
Danes, Russians, Croats, Poles, Italians, French, and Spaniards for cen- 



6 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

tunes past. Impotent and not able to ward them off, she has tfeen con- 
tinually destroyed, until the genius of Bismarck welded her twenty-six 
States together into one unit, and Germany made the vow that she would 
never again give any one such chances. That is why we kept our army, 
and if a people have an army at all, it is a waste not to make it strong 
enough for any emergency. That it is not too strong may be judged from 
the fact that Germany is now attacked by seven nations. 

You hear people say that the large standing establishment, the enormous 
cost of it, and the time wasted, is a sin against culture, advancement, and 
scientific progress. The Germany of to-day proves the contrary. While 
we have been keeping up a big army — which, by the way, is the cheapest 
of the European armies so far as the taxpayer is concorned — we have 
increased our population, we have enormously increased our wealth, we 
have l)uilt up a gigantic oversea trade, we have constructed the second 
largest merchant marine in the world. More, we have been able to spend 
as much as $250,000,000 a year to take care of our workmen, giving them a 
compulsory insurance against sickness and invalidism, accident, and old 
age, pensioning widows and providing for orphans. Every German em- 
ployee earning less than 5,000 marks a year can with a degree of security 
look forward to a comfortable provision for himself and for the people dear 
to him when his own forces fail. We pay yearly more for this social work 
than we ever paid for our army. 

And our productive and inventive genius has not suffered. I do not 
say that Germany's civilization is superior to that of England and France; 
it certainly is superior to the civilization of any of the other warring nations. 
We have been able to give our people a primary and technical education 
of the first order, and that in turn has led to the perfection of scientific 
work and to inventions that are a comfort to all the world. Germany 
stands in the first rank in applied science, be it in chemistry, or electricity, or 
in the perfection of medicines. With just pride the Germans provide a 
great many absolute necessities of life to a very large part of the world. 
While the population has increased 50 per cent., the wealth of the nation 
is now three times what it was before, and thanks to our democratic gov- 
ernment the repartition of this wealth is such that we have a well-to-do 
middle class and few colossal fortunes; and the number of really poor people 
in Germany is infinitely small in comparison with other countries. 

This is the story of German militarism, unaggressive and certainly not 
unproductive, based on actual facts. Those antagonistic to our nation 
say it has created a warlike spirit, and that such a spirit by itself is a danger. 
This warlike spirit is generally shown by people going to war; and yet of 
all the European peoples Germany alone did not do that. 

The case of Belgium is frequently cited as proving Germany's reckless 
warlike spirit. It is said we have broken wantonly most solemn treaties, 
and therefore we ought to be punished for it. The question as to the right — 
so far as obligations under treaties go — has been decided by nearly all 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 7 

nations in the same spirit — namely, that no nation can bind itself by a treaty 

to its own destruction, just as no individual can so bind himself by contract; 

that the national interest supersedes the international interest, and that 

treaties are closed on the basis of circumstances existing at the time they 

are made, and that therefore they are not binding when those circumstances 

change. 

Treaties That Are Not Binding 

England, who claims to have gone to war on account of the breach of 
Belgium's neutrality, has never hesitated to break her obligations whenever 
she considered doing so of paramount interest. She has done so in this war 
any number of times. There is a treaty of peace and amity between 
Germany and Portugal which is to be broken on England's bidding. There 
is the Triple Alliance, which is to be severed at English solicitation. Egypt 
is a sovereign State, where the rights of the foreigner are guaranteed by 
solemn pledges, yet the Khedive had to banish the German Minister and 
even the judges of the mixed tribunal at England's command. China is 
a neutral country and bound to the open-door policy by international 
treaties; she has been invaded by the Allies in breach of these treaties. 
Ivlorocco has pacts binding England as well as Germany, regulating the 
rights of the foreigners; yet the German diplomatic representative has 
been chased out of the country. 

When Sir Edward Grey expounded the European situation before the 
English Parliament he cited Gladstone in regard to Belgium — Gladstone, 
who said that the maintenance of the obligations of a treaty without regard 
to changed circumstances was an impracticable, stringent proposition to 
which he could not adhere; and when England seized two Turkish dread- 
noughts on the Tyne on August 8, she proclaimed the fact with the fol- 
lowing words: "In accordance with the recognized principle of the right 
and supreme duty to assure national safety in times of war." France has 
been doing the same in Morocco; and Japan, when she sent to the German 
Consul in Mukden — a Chinese city in Manchuria— his passports, acted on 
the same principle, leaving aside all her other infractions on Chinese treaties 
and rights. 

This is sad and does not portend well for the permanent peace by ar- 
rangement of international affairs through treaties; yet it seems that it can 
not be helped. The United States Supreme Court says in a judgment 
rendered in 1889, written by Judge Field, expressing the unanimous con- 
viction of the whole court: "Circumstances may arise which would not 
only justify the Government in disregarding their treaty stipulations, but 
demand in the interest of the country that it should do so. There can be 
no question that unexpected events may call for a change of the policy 
of the country." This judgment was handed down when the Chinese were 
excluded from the United States in violation of a previous treaty which 
had assured them the same rights as United States citizens; and the United 
States has acted on the quoted decision ever since. 



8 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

The Case of Belgium 

It is, therefore, universally recognized that the vital interests of a 
country supersede its treaty obligations. But though this is the theo- 
retic side of the question, there is a practical one as regards Belgium: 
When the war broke out there was no enforceable treaty in existence to 
which Germany was a party. Originally, in 1839, a treaty was concluded 
providing for such neutrality. In 1866, France demanded of Prussia the 
right to take possession of Belgium, and the written French offer was made 
knowTi by Bismarck in July, 1870. Then England demanded and obtained 
separate treaties with France and with the North-German Federation to 
the effect that they should respect Belgium's neutrality, and such treaties 
were signed on the 9th and 26th of August, 1870, respectively. According 
to them both countries guaranteed Belgium's neutrality for the duration 
of the war and for one year thereafter. The war came to an end with the 
Frankfurt Peace in 1871, and the treaty between Belgium and the North- 
German Federation expired in May, 1872. 

Why the new treaties, if the old one held good? The Imperial Chan- 
cellor has been continuously misrepresented as admitting that in the case 
of Belgium a treaty obligation was broken. What he said was that the 
neutrality of Belgium could not be respected and that we were sincerely 
sorry that Belgium, a country that in fact had nothing to do with the 
question at issue and might wish to stay neutral, had to be overrun. But 
it should not be forgotten that the offer of indemnity to Belgium and the 
full maintenance of her sovereignty had been made not only once but even 
a second time after the fall of Liege, and that it would have been entirely 
possible for Belgium to avoid all the devastation under which she is now 
suffering. 

England takes the position that in case France had used Belgium as a 
stepping-stone, England would have gone to war against France for breaking 
the Belgian neutrality. This is a remarkable proposition. On July 30, 
the Belgian charge d'affaires at St. Petersburg wrote to his Government — 
and the authenticity of this letter can not be impeached — that the Russian 
war-party got the upper hand upon England's assurance that she would 
stand in with France. This was written before the Belgian question ever 
came up; and before Sir Edward Grey expounded in Parliament the 
Belgian question, he insisted that England was obliged to protect the 
French coast against Germany because of the amity and friendship existing 
between the two nations. He then read the correspondence of 191 2 be- 
tween himself and the French Minister of War, where the arrangement is 
alluded to that the French fleet should protect the Mediterranean Sea 
and the English fleet the northern coast of France. So in consequence of 
this. Sir Edward Grey insisted to Count Lichnowsky that the maintenance of 
Belgium's neutraUty alone would not keep England from going to war, 
but that, if France should be attacked, England would aid her. 

I wish an intelUgent American reader to picture to himself a situation 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 9 

where England protects the French coast against Germany and goes to 
war against France for breacli of Belgian neutrality. 

But Belgium was not neutral at all any more, and with her circum- 
stances had greatly changed. Even since 1906 she had been in correspon- 
dence with England, elaborating plans for a common defense, proxiding for 
the landing of a hundred thousand English at Antwerp. She had been in 
correspondence with France, building fortresses all along the German 
frontier, which form a continuous chain with the French fortresses along 
that same frontier. She had been changing her military system to a 
system of compulsory conscription, establishing an army of more than 
three hundred thousand men, creating — on English instigation — a spy 
system on her eastern frontier, acquiring enormous oversea possessions of 
nine hundred thousand square miles, an area three times as great as Germany 
and i)opulated by nine million inhabitants. This acquisition, by the way, 
was also obtained by breach of treaty. 

Belgian population at home is bigger by one-half than that of Portugal. 
Though Belgium left her frontiers toward France entirely unprotected and 
open, she was actively preparing to make a stand against Germany. This 
is not the "poor little country" that is being pictured to the Americans. 
I think the Belgian lighting, which she has had to do almost quite alone 
against a large part of the German forces, should fully prove that. 

But she did more. The Imperial Chancellor said that he had proofs 
that the French were to invade German}- by way of Belgium. Proof there 
is. French soldiers and French guns, in spite of all the denials made by the 
French Ambassador at Washington, were in Liege and Namur before the 
30th of July. Certainly this proof is only in private letters, but it comes 
from absolutely unimpeachable people. Of course it is not in the White 
Books, such as are held up as evidence of the purest water. 

But do Americans believe all the "official news" that the Russians are 
sending continuously from the seat of war as to their enormous successes, 
the routing of the Austrians, the destruction of their whole army, the march 
on \'ienna and Berlin, and so forth? I do not think they do; l)Ut why then 
place an implicit faith on so-called White Books, written by identically 
the same people? Such books are written for the purpose of making out a 
nation's case, and they are the diplomatic war weapons used in the war of 
dij^lomatists that always precedes the war at arms. 

There is a great deal of talk of crushing Germany, and the necessity for 
it, because of her military spirit. I confess we are a manly people, and want 
to be strong and want to be secure. We want to live and to thrive, and are 
ready to pay for our civic liberty and national independence with our blood. 
And we should despise a nation that did not feel the same way. 

Safety for the Monroe Doctrine 

The case of England is difYerent. Though she wants to be free and 
independent, she has always managed to have her fighting done for her by 



ID SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

others, from the time she trafficked in Hessians, and that is why she has not 
had a standing army such as Lord Roberts and his friends have always 
demanded. Though there is a lighting spirit in the EngUsh Army, it is 
mostly Irish, and so are the leaders — Lord Roberts, Lord Beresford, Sir 
John French, Admiral Jellicoe, and Lord Kitchen.er of Khartum. The way 
in which she cares for the little nations whose interests she has so much 
at heart is to allow her fighting to be done by the Belgians, of whom Sir 
Edward Grey said that he expected them to fight to the last man for the 
independence of the country. And so she called in the Canadians, who 
should have much better things to do; and she made a treaty with Portugal 
to help her — the Portuguese, who do not know what the conflict is about. 
She brings over ambitious Indian princes and poor ignorant Indian soldiers 
to fight against the white men; she relies on Japan and she gets the Boers 
to attack the German possessions; she tries to persuade Italy to do some 
fighting for her. Most of these are "poor little States," who now are ex- 
pected to fight for the sovereignty and independence of Great Britain. In 
this way she has time left to talk at home and to force the unemployed into 
a new army that is going to be created. That she too must become mili- 
taristic she now finds out to her surprise and grief. 

The fact that Canada has taken part in this struggle has opened up a 
new prospective to Americans. It is a wilful breach of the Monroe Doctrine 
for an American self-governing dominion to go to war, thereby exposing 
the American Continent to a counter-attack from Europe and risking to 
disarrange the present equilibrium. But I think America can set her mind 
at rest on that point. I at least would most emphatically say that no 
matter what happens the Monroe Doctrine will not be violated by Germany 
either in North America or in South America. When she is victorious there 
will be enough property of her antagonists lying about over the four parts 
of the globe to keep Germany from the necessity of looking any farther, 
and causing trouble where she seeks friendship and sympathy. 

While England in the Venezuelan case of 1895 most coolly challenged 
the Monroe Doctrine, it was Germany in 1904, in a similar case, also with 
Venezuela, who submitted her claim in Washington and got the consent 
of the United States Government to prosecute the collection. Moreover, 
I am in the position to state here that immediately after the outbreak of 
the war, by one of the first mails that reached the United States, the German 
Government sent of its own free initiative a solemn declaration to the 
Department of State that whatever happened she Avould fully respect the 
Monroe Doctrine. 

The Dangers of Navyism 

I wish also to make clear to the American people that Germany neither 
wanted nor started this war, which had its origin in Russia's pretensions to 
mix in Austrian affairs, and that got its size from the fact that England and 
France joined the conflict, the latter from treaty obligations, the former 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR ii 

from self-interest, and that we have no amhitions of enlargement in Europe 
or in America. Modern democracies, and especially the German one, 
which is directed by the most liberal ballot law that exists, even more 
liberal than the one in use in the United States, rest at least in Europe on a 
national basis. 

We do not believe in incorporating in our Empire any parts of nations 
that are not of our own language and race. The history of Europe has 
shown us the danger of such a thing. The difficulties between France and 
Germany are over the French-speaking population in Lorraine; the small 
internal differences in Germany came because of some millions of Poles 
and thirty thousand Danes; the trouble between Austria and Italy is be- 
cause of a few hundred thousand Italian-speaking people under Austrian, 
government. England had what nearly amounted to a civil war because 
of Ireland. The trouble in Russia is on account of the Poles, Finns, and 
Baltic Germans; and Austria, the country of many nations, is not very 
strong just for this very reason. And as to oversea possessions, as I said 
before, there are enough to be had without borrowing trouble; cspeciallv 
in Africa, where considerable parts of land lend themselves to colonization 
by the white man. 

Even there our ambitions do not go very far and we are quite content 
with what we have, and with our spheres of influence in Mesopotamia, and 
some countries such as Morocco, that a civilized nation with great resources 
and inventive genius might open to the world's culture. All assertions 
that our ambition goes beyond this are untrue, and simply invented for 
the purpose of rousing distrust between the United States and a country 
that has for generations been the friend of the Stars and Stripes, and that 
has never gone to war with you as England has done. 

I have read in your papers statements to the effect that probably the 
next thing Germany would do after the close of the present war would be 
to invade the United States or take Brazil. W^hy not say the same of 
England? She has always had a na\y twice the size of that of any other 
nation; she is now creating a big army; she has always been aggressive; she 
has conquered half the world; she has shown utter disregard of treaties; she 
has coaling stations all along the American coast, which form a fighting 
basis from Halifax down to the Falklands and from Chile up to British 
Columbia; she controls the entrance to the Panama Canal; she is even now 
dictating to Uncle Sam her own rights and laws in regard to contraband, 
seizing American petroleum, seizing American ships flying the Stars and 
Stripes, harassing American citizens, cutting cables, using wireless stations 
as she pleases, maiming the trade of America, locking uj) the ^lediterranean, 
the North Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. 

Why not consider navyism under the same light that we do militarism? 
I ask, who is bulldozing the rest of the world, including America, at this 
present moment? England wants to rule the seas. There lies her power; 
thence comes her commerce and therefore her riches. Whenever a nation 



12 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

that is but human — as I think the EngUsh are — poses as being on a higher 
level than any other nation, doing e\ery thing for the benefit of the under- 
dog, because of altruism and a recognition of the sacredness of her given 
word, disclaiming emphatically any self-interest, while at the same time 
advertising through her writers the loftiness of her intentions, I cannot 
help feeling suspicious, and everybody else should, it seems to me, feel the 
same way. 

Americans have been hearing a great deal about the English angel 
without wings standing with a sword drawn for the protection of liberty, 
freedom, and humanity and just causes, using as watchwords the fight 
against militarism, the principle that might is right, the infringement of the 
•Monroe Doctrine, and so on. She has sent a host of English authors of a 
very special type to defend her case. I read articles by G. K. Chesterton, 
Hall Caine, H. G. Wells, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, and other writers of 
fiction. They consider the American people a sentimental people, preferring 
humane stories to the cold truth, fiction to facts, and unused to doing their 
own thinking. Well, fiction is what these men are writing; that is their 
business, and the gentleman who detailed the English case in the issue 
of The Saturday Evening Post of October 17th, Mr. Arnold Bennett, is an 
artist of no common attainments. 

But I shall make free to dig somewhat deeper into what I see to be the 
reason for the English attitude. England has created a large shipping 
trade and acquired enormous possessions oversea, and she felt secure in 
her supremacy. She was uneasy only on account of the United States, 
which — until Germany loomed up on the horizon as a big Power — she tried 
to treat as she was treating Germany before the war. But now she feels 
that her absolute sway is in danger. Even in her own domain she does a 
very large share only by foreign help. Most of the big bankers, from 
Rothschild down, are of German descent; the whole English credit would 
have broken down if the English authorities had not within four hours 
forced Baron Schroeder to become a British citizen; the diamond and gold 
business is in the hands of AngHcized Germans; theirs is a large share in the 
produce business. The English cannot do without German clerks. 

A Commercial Quarrel 

I remember a speech by the chairman of the London Chamber of Com- 
merce, Lord South wark, not longer ago than last June, in which he said: 
"You Germans are getting ahead of us because you are working 16 per 
cent longer than we and because you do not consider Saturday a holiday." 
That state of things was not felt much so long as it was going on within 
British confines and for the interest of Great Britain alone — that is, until 
about 1880; but then the German nation commenced to assert itself. Ger- 
mans learn all the languages, whereas the English very seldom do. If an 
Englishman wants a stenographer to write Portuguese letters to Brazil he 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 13 

must take a German clerk. German dominion in trade all over the ^sorld 
has been established through the fact that the German talks to the people 
in their own language, respects their national feeling, finds out their national 
wants, and delivers to them exactly what they wish to get. He never says, 
"We can not do this" or "You have to take our standard," but carefully 
carries out their orders according to the best scientific methods, and there- 
fore at the best price. The German iron industry has, because of its 
improved methods, obtained a great part of England's trade. German 
machinery, except in the textile business, is more efficient than English 
machinery. The field of electricity has been entirely abandoned by England 
to America and Germany. Dyestuffs are now even shipped by way of 
America and Canada back to England. German proprietary medicines 
have conquered the world market and the German competition is felt 
everywhere. 

Then, too, there is the enormous increase of German shipping, in spite 
of the fact that practically all the English companies doing passenger 
ser^'ice are half broke. While the International Mercantile Marine Com- 
pany has suspended payment and the big liners of the Cunard Line can live 
only by subsidies, Germany has been building up a most magnificent 
merchant marine, with ships that exceed in comfort and size anything 
launched from England's shipyards. Even in the tramp-steamer business, 
the backbone of English shipping, the Germans have made big inroads. 
So while the trade of Great Britain and Ireland since 1870 has risen from 
two billion dollars to five and a half billions, that of Germany has risen from 
one billion to five billions — in other words, while Germany's trade is now 
five times what it was in 1870, English trade is only two and a half times its 
former amount. For a commercial nation such as England, this condition 
is very serious. It goes to the very core of the nation's existence. There- 
fore, Great Britain faced the alternative of getting better habits of work, 
improved machinery, better education, better knowledge of foreign languages 
— that is, being more industrious, less luxurious, and more painstaking — 
or of fighting. But E^igland was not accustomed to doing her own fight- 
ing, save with her fleet. The other fellows, whose welfare she has so much 
at heart, could fight for her, so it was not very difficult for her to make her 
choice. 

This is the real explanation of the present war. The correctness of 
this view is proved by the constant invitations sent out from England to 
America to help her get away with the German trade, an idea that is justly 
repulsive to the American mind. So it was not Germany's militarism that 
England feared, but German trade and commerce, which she could not 
destroy because of the military and naval forces behind them. 

Germany is now attacked by seven nations. She is fighting morally 
for her freedom and for her existence. She has no special grudge against 
anybody. She is modest in her aspirations, and merely wants to maintain 
her place under the sun. She wants equal opportunity, open-door politics. 



14 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

and open commerce throughout the world. Nor is she either Hunnic or 
barbarian, as Americans will have learned from the twenty-five million 
German or German-American people who live in their midst. She is out 
for conquest on a peaceful line, the line where the higher culture wins, 
where the more industrious and laborious are sure to prevail. This is to 
the interest of all the world. Germany has to her record forty-four years 
of peace, and she has never coveted her neighbors' possessions. So, as 
far as the moral issue goes, she has much the best showing to make of all 
the nations now at war, and it is within eternal justice that she should and 
will prevail. 



ENGLAND'S SHARE OF GUILT IN THE WAR 

A Review of the Official Publications, Especially of the English Docu- 
ments, Vouched for by Dr. Demburg 

[The follo-u'ifjg is presented as u complete defense of the Cenmin position in the 
present war, and is based upon examination of the German and English " U'hite Papers." 
It was prepared in Germany and forwarded to Dr. Bernhard Demburg, ivho had it 
translated for the New York " Times." Dr. Demburg gives this statement his full approval 
and accepts complete responsibility for it.] 

Two of the five great European Powers that are at present engaged in 
war, Austria-Hungary and Russia, whose differences for years have been 
constantly increasing in sharpness, and after the tragedy in Sarajevo became 
impossible to be bridged by diplomacy, conjured up the frightful struggle. 

With these two, two other Powers are so closeh' united by alliances 
that their participation in the war also was unavoidal)le; thev are Germany 
and France. 

There are two other great European Powers whose relations to the two 
aforesaid groups before the war were very much alike in the essential points. 
Just as Italy was politically tied by alliance to the Central Powers, so 
England was with the Franco-Russian Alliance. Hence it was uncertain 
how these countries, each geographically removed from the main body of 
the Continent, would act in a war, and it seemed quite possible that both 
would decide to remain neutral. 

As a matter of fact, the Italian Government came to the view that such 
a stand would be for the best interests of its country. 

This decision might have made it considerably more easy for England 
also to maintain her neutrality, which from political, economical, and 
ethical reasons would have been advantageous and natural for the Island 
Empire. To the surprise and indignation of all those Germans who for 
years had been working toward an adjustment of the conflicting interests 
of both countries — among these ought to be mentioned, above all, the 
Kaiser and the Imperial Chancellor— the Liberal British Ministry imme- 
diately declared war on Germany, and did not confine itself to a naval war, 
but, in keeping with agreements reached years ago between the English 
and the French Genexal Staffs, as is now admitted, equipped an expedi- 
tionary army, thus considerably strengthening the French forces. 

The question arises, "What reasons led British politics to this monstrous 
step?" 

Much has been written during the last weeks from the German side, 
criticizing most sharply and with great justification the motive of the 
London Cabinet. In the following discussion we will confine ourselves to an 



i6 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

impartial review of the documents published by the English Government 
itself in its own defense. 

The essential part of this justification is contained in the " Correspon- 
dence Concerning the European Crisis" placed before the British Parliament 
shortly after the start of the war, which is known as the British "White 
Paper." In amplification are to be considered the "White Book" placed 
by the German Government before th§ Reichstag, and the "Orange Book" 
published by Russia. 



I. 
THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION 

In a public speech, delivered September ig, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, Mr. Lloyd-George, according to the report of the Westminster 
Gazette, which may be considered as his organ, characterized the quarrel 
between Germany and Russia in the picturesque manner which this states- 
man prefers, as follows: 

GERMANY — I insist that you stand aside with crossed arms while Austria 
strangles your little brother Servia. 

RUSSIA — Just you touch this Httle fellow and I will tear your ramshackle 
Empire limb from limb. 

We willnot waste words in considering the flippant form here used in 
a discussion of an unspeakably bloody and world-historic conflict. But this 
expression in very pregnant form makes Russia appear in the light in 
which the London powers-that-be desire to show the Empire of the Czar 
to the British people, viz., in the role of the noble-hearted protector of 
persecuted innocence, while Germany, supporting and egging on Austria- 
Hungary, is shown as morally responsible for the war. 

Cites English Documents 

This, also, is the chain of thought in the speech of the British Prime 
Minister in the House of Commons on August 4. Translations of this 
speech have been spread by the British Government in neutral countries 
in himdreds of thousands of copies under the title, "The Power Responsible 
for War Is Germany." 

Now, we claim that the British "White Paper" itself furnishes irrefut- 
able proof that not Germany, which up to the last moment offered the hand 
of mediation, but Russia is responsible for the war, and that the Foreign 
Office at London was fully cognizant of this fact. 

Furthermore, the "White Paper" shows that England's claim that she 
entered this war solely as a protector of the small nations is a fable. 

The documents reproduced in the "White Paper" do not begin until 
July 20, and only a few introductory dispatches before the 24th are given. 
The first of the very important reports of the British Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, to Secretary of State Grey is dated 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 17 

on that day; on the same day the note addressed by Austria-Hungary to 
the Ser\dan Government had been brought to the knowledge of the European 
Cabinets, and the British Ambassador conferred with the Russian Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasanow, over this matter. The French Minister 
also took part in this conference. When the latter and M. Sasanow in the 
most insistent way tried to prove to Buchanan that England, together with 
Russia and France, must assume a threatening attitude toward Austria- 
Hungary and Germany, the British Ambassador replied: 

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had 
just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Govern- 
ment, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from 
his Majesty's (Tovernment that would entail an unconditional engagement on their 
part to support fiussia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in 
Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country- would never be sanctioned by 
British public opinion. — British " White Paper" No. 6. 

The British Ambassador thereupon asked the question whether Russia 
was thinking of e\'cntually declaring war on Austria. The following was 
the answer: 

M. Sasanow said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at 
any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this after- 
noon to consider the whole question 

The dispatch continues: 

French Ambassador and M. Sasanow both continue to press me for a declaration 
of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian 
Governments. . . . — British " White Paper" No. 6. 

This shows plainly that the Russian mobilization must ha\'c been 
planned even before July 24, for otherwise M. Sasanow could not have 
spoken of the necessity of carrying it through. 

It is furthermore very remarkable that the Russian Minister on this 
early da}^ spoke of the mobilization in general and not of the partial mobili- 
zation against Austria-Hungary. 

Finally, we find that the British Government was fully informed at the 
\Gvy latest on July 24 — it may have had before it previous documents, 
but they are not contained in the "White Paper" — concerning Russian 
mobilization, and thereby the development of Russian and French politics 
that had to be anticipated. 

Russian Aggression 

Had there been any doubts concerning these matters on the part of the 
British Government, the continual urging of Russian and French diplo- 
matists must have made things plain. Russia's aggressive policy, and not 
the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, which did not come until five 
days later, led to the European War. Servia meant so little to England, 
although England traditionally poses as a protector of small nations, that 
the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg was able to describe England's 



1 8 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

interest in the kingdom on the Save as nil. Only later, after the begin- 
ning of the war, England warmed up to Servia, and in the aforementioned 
speech Mr. Lloyd-George found the most hearty tones in speaking of the 
heroic fight of this "little nation," although he was obliged to admit simul- 
taneously that its history is not untainted. 

On the day following that conversation, on July 25, the British 
Ambassador had another talk with M. Sasanow, during the course of which 
he felt obliged to express to the Russian Government a serious warning 
concerning its mobilization. 

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by 
mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace, his 
Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions and she would take 
no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against 
Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and 
establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really 
wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly 
with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of 
blood would flow and we would in the end be dragged into war 

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and 
warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content with mere 
mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare 
war at once! His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush 
Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure 
of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once 
more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could 
restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate. — British ''White Paper" 
No. 27. 

A more convincing contradiction of the claim that Germany fell upon 
unexpectant Russia can hardly be imagined. Sasanow's conversation 
with the British Ambassador shows that Russia had decided from the 
beginning to bring about the war, unless Austria would subject itself to 
Russia's dictation. 

Now, Russia was not alone concerned about Servia, but from its view- 
point Austria-Hungary must not maintain the preponderant position in 
the Balkans. 

Buchanan Warned Russia 

Sure of French help, Russia was determined to work against this. The 
reports of the British representative do not suggest with a word that Ger- 
many was responsible for the war; on the contrary, Sir Buchanan again, on 
his own account, warned the Russian Government to keep aloof from 
military measures, in his conversation with M. Sasanow on July 27, 
although the "White Paper" does not show that he had received any 
instructions by Sir Edward Grey. 

His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to 
precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Govern- 
ment would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible, and that troops 
would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued. — British " White 
Paper" No. 44. 

Just as its own Ambassador in St. Petersburg pointed out to the British 
Government the dangers of Russian mobiUzation, England did not lack 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 19 

German warnings. On July 28 the British Ambassador in BerKn, Sir 
E. Goschen, reported as follows by wire concerning a conversation with 
the Imperial Chancellor: 

. . . but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia 
had mobilized fourteen army corps in the south, he thought the situation was very 
serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circum- 
stances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. 
He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to 
take similar measures, and if war were to result Russia would be entirely responsible. 
^British " White Paper" No. 71. 

In a telegram of Mr. Goschen's of July 30, reporting a conversation 
with the Secretary of State Von Jagow, it is stated: 

He begged me to impress on you the difficulty of Germany's position in view of 
Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in 
France. — British "White Paper" No. q8. 

The British Government has added a few further publications to its 
"White Paper." Among these is a report of the hitherto British Ambassa- 
dor in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen. The document is dated September i ; 
that is, a full month after the outbreak of the war. The tendency of 
this publication is not only to unburden Russia and England from all 
blame and to put it upon German and Austro-Hungarian politics, but it 
attempts to make Germany responsible for the war to a greater extent than 
Austria-Hungary, in trying to sow dissension between the two allies. 

Bunsen's Misrepresentation 

Ambassador de Bunsen represents matters as if Germany, through 
its ultimatum to Russia on July 31, had roughly interrupted negotiations 
promising success then going on between Vienna and St. Petersburg. In this 
report it is stated: 

(Retranslated) — M. Schebeko [the Russian Ambassador at Vienna) on July 28 
attempted to induce the Austrian Government to authorize Count Scapar>' to con- 
tinue negotiations which he had been carrying on with M. Sasanow, and which 
appeared ver>' promising. Count Berchtold on this day declined, but two days 
later, July 30, although Russia then had already started partial mobilization 
against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again in the most courteous manner and 
gave his consent to continuation of the pourparleurs. . . . On August i, M. Sche- 
beko informed me that Austria was ready to submit to mediation those parts of its 
note to Servia which appeared to be irreconcilable to the independence of Servia. 
. . . Unfortunately these pourparleurs in St. Petersburg and Vienna were suddenly 
broken off by the quarrel being remo\'ed to the more dangerous territory of 
a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany, on July 31, stepped 
between the two with its double ultimatum addressed to St. Petersburg and Paris. 
... A delay of a few days in all probability would have spared Europe one of the 
greatest wars in history. 

On the other hand, be it remembered that the fact that any negotiations 
between Austria and Russia were carried on up to the last hour was solely 
the result of the uninterrupted German efforts to maintain peace, which 
fact Sir Maurice de Bunsen very wisely buries in silence. These negotia- 
tions, by the way, hardly were as promising of success as is made to appear. 



20 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

The Austrian version of it is found in the Vienna Fremdenblatt of September 
25, 1 9 14. There the most important spots of Bunsen's report, that Austria- 
Hungary had been ready to moderate several points of its note to Servia, 
are mentioned as follows: 

As we are told by a well-informed source, these assertions do not at all corre- 
spond to the facts; furthermore, from the very nature of the steps undertaken by 
the dual Monarchy in Belgrade, this would have been entirely inconceivable. 

A glance. at the date shows that the Bunsen report is misleading, for he 
himself tells that Count Berchtold, on July 30, had expressed his consent 
to a continuation of the e.xchange of thought in St. Petersburg; the latter, 
therefore, could not begin before the 31st, while in the night from July 30 
to 31, the mobilization of the entire Russian Army against Germany was 
ordered in St. Petersburg, finally making impossible the continuation of the 
last German attempt at mediation in Vienna. 

The truth is, in spite of Russian and English twistings, that without 
the interval caused by Germany's efforts in Vienna, which interval England 
allowed to pass unused in St. Petersburg, the war would have broken out 
a few days sooner. 

Let us consider how the fact of the Russian mobilization, the dimensions 
and tendency of which were brought to the knowledge of the London Cabinet 
at the very latest on July 24, must affect Germany. 

On July 24, the Russian Government declared, in an ofi&cial communique, 
it would be impossible for it to remain indifferent in an Austro-Servian 
conflict. 

Germany's Hand Forced 

This declaration was followed immediately by military measures which 
represented the beginning of Russian mobilization long planned. But even 
on July 27 the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof, assured the German 
Military Attache upon word of honor (Annex 11 of the German "White 
Paper") that no order for mobilization had been given and no reservists 
had been drawn and no horse had been commandeered. 

Although in this conversation there had been left no doubt to the 
Russian Minister of War concerning the fact that measures of mobilization 
against Austria must be considered by Germany also as very threatening 
toward itself, during the next days news of the Russian mobilization arrived 
in quick succession. 

On the 29th, mobilization of Southern and Southwestern Russia was 
ordered, which was extended on the 30th to twenty-three provinces. 

On the night of the 30th to the 31st, while the efforts of the Kaiser to 
maintain peace were continuing and were receiving friendly attention in 
Vienna, in St. Petersburg the mobilization of the entire Russian Army 
was ordered. Even as late as 2 p.m. on the 31st, however (German "White 
Paper," page 18, of New York Times reprint), the Czar telegraphed the 
Kaiser that the military measures now being taken were meant for defensive 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 21 

purposes against Austria's preparations, and he gave his pledge as far 
away from desiring war. 

In the face of such evident dupKcity of Russian pohtics, a further delay 
such as was desired by Sir Maurice de Bunsen would have been for every 
German statesman a crime against the security of his own country. 

On the other hand, upon what German measures did the Russian 
Government base its order for mobilization? The British "White Paper" 
proves how frivolously steps leading to the most serious results were ordered 
in St. Petersburg. On July 30, Sir George Buchanan telegraphed: 

M. Sasanow told us that absolute proof was in possession of the Russian Go\ern- 
ment that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia, 
more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. — British "White Paper" 
No. gy. 

J*roofs Lacking 

On the other hand, Buchanan's telegram of July 31 (British "White 
Paper" No. 113) states: 

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making acti\e military prepara- 
tions, and she cannot afford to let her get a start. — British " White Paper" No. iij. 

So, from one day to the next the "absolute proof" changed to a reason 
for the assumption. In reality, both were assertions that lack all proof. 

The finishing part of a telegram sent by the British Ambassador in 
Berlin to Sir Edward Grey on July 31 deserves special mention: 

He [the German Secretary of State] again assured me that both the Emperor 
William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia and the German Foreign Office, 
had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue 
discussion — and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising 
nature — ^but Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything. — British "White Paper" 
No. 121. 

Therefore, the German Chancellor, in his memorandum placed before 
the Reichstag, stated with full justification: 

The Russian Government has smashed the laborious attempts at mediation on 
the part of the European State Chancelleries, on the eve of success, by the mobiliza- 
tion, endangering the safety of the Empire. The measures for a mobilization, about 
whose seriousness the Russian Government was fully acquainted from the beginning, 
in connection with their constant denial, show clearly that Russia wanted war. 

To this is to be added that the English Government also was made fully cognizant 
of the intentions of the Russian mobilization, by a witness that could not be sus- 
pected, namely, its own representati\'e in St. Petersburg, and therefore must bear 
full responsibility. 



II. 
GREY'S OMISSIONS AND ERRORS 



We have seen from the "Blue Book" that the Secretary of State in 
London was informed at the very latest on July 24, by his Ambassador 
in St. Petersburg, of the plan of the Russian mobilization, and consequently 
of the tremendous seriousness of the European situation. Yet eight to 



22 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

nine days had to elapse before the beginning of the war. Let us see whether 
Sir Edward Grey used this time to preserve peace, according to his own 
documents. 

From this testimony it appears that even at the beginning of the last 
and decisive part of the European crisis, which began on June 28, 1914, 
with the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Sir Edward Grey 
refrained from considering a direct participation of his country in the 
possible world-war. At least, this must be the impression gained from 
his remarks to the representatives of the two Powers with whom England 
is to-day at war. Thus, he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, 
Count Mensdorff, on July 23 : 

The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many 
as four great Powers of Europe — let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany — ■ 
were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must- involve the expenditure of so vast 
a sum of money and such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied 
or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. — British " White 
Paper" No. 3. 

Here Grey speaks only of four of the big Powers at most that may go to 
war, without even hinting at the fifth, namely, England. On July 24, he 
had another conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, the theme of 
which was the note — meanwhile presented to Servia. It caused appre- 
hensions on his part, but he declared again: 

The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern 
of his Majesty's Government 

I [Grey] ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of 
views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done 
to mitigate the difficulties of the situation. — British " White Paper" No. 5. 

We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to hesitate 
where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct would have 
been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with great art 
by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the conversation 
of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon, in London: 

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers 
he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed 
out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some 
opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march 
into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia 
would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked 
Servia, and, therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia it would be too late 
for any mediation. — British "White Paper" No. 10. 

The Situation on July 24 

Thus: England must not give any advice to Russia before it knows 
Russia's intent and even its measures. But inasmuch as Austria will have 
proceeded against Servia by that time, Russia must make war, and the con- 
clusion is that even on July 24 the catastrophe is considered unavoidable. 
Grey shows himself more and more hypnotized by the fatalistic view that 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 2^ 

it is too late. Hence he reports also on July 24 a conversation of the 
German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky: 

I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a 
personal hope that, if need arose, I would endeavor to exercise moderating influence 
at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character 
of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the 
demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did 
not believe any Power could exercise influence alone. — British " White Paper" No. 11. 

From a conversation of Grey with Prince Lichnowsk}', the German 
Ambassador, on July 25: 

Alone, we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling [this refers 
to the visit at St. Petersburg by Messrs. Poincare and VivianiJ at the moment, and 
I had had no time to consult them, and could not, therefore, be sure of their views. — 
British " White Paper" No. 2$. 

If Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired the maintenance of peace, he must 
have had to use his entire influence at St. Petersburg to bring about the 
stopping of the threatening military measures taken by Russia, whereas 
he was waiting for the opinion of the French Government. He was bound 
to do this, so much the more in view of the fact that he demanded from 
Germany that it should exert its influence with Austria. 

That this request of Grey's was complied with by Germany in so far 
as it was in any way in accord with the alliance with Austria-Hungary, 
and that in Vienna every effort was made to conciliate matters, is shown 
by the assurance of the Chancellor. He declares: 

In spite of this [the Austro-Hungarian Government having remarked with full 
appreciation of our action that it had come too late, we continued our mediatory 
efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise con- 
sistent with the dignity of the Monarchy. — German " White Paper " page ly, of New 
York "Times" reprint. 

Grey w^ell knew that Germany was doing all it could to mediate in 
Vienna. He expressed his recognition and his joy over it on July 28 C' Blue 
Book," page 67): 

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the 
German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation 
recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you. — British " White Paper" No. 67.* 

" No diplomatic pressure whatever was exerted [by Germany] on Vienna, which, 
under the protection of Berlin, was permitted to do with Servia as she liked." 

Grey's own words contradict this assertion. 

Neither has Grey been left in the dark by the German side concerning 
the difficulties, which by the Russian mobilization made every attempt to 

* Recently a book entitled "Why We Make W'ar," in defence of Great Britain, 
appeared at Oxford, as the authors of which "Members of the Faculty for Modern 
History in Oxford" are mentioned. This work undertakes, on the ground of the 
official publications, to whitewash Grey's policy, and, of course, incidentally the 
Russian policy. Altogether this publication, parading in the gown of science, is 
contradicted by our own presentation of the facts; it may be mentioned also that 
this work contains in part positive untruths. Thus it states on page 70 (retransla- 
tion) : 



24 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

mediate in Vienna abortive. Even on July 31, the British Ambassador in 
Berlin telegraphed: 

The Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation 
at \'ienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against 
Austria. He has done everything possible to obtain his object at Vienna, perhaps 
even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. — British " While 
Paper" No. 108. 

England and Russia 

How, on the other hand, about Grey's action with Russia? From the 
very beginning one should have had a right to expect that, as Germany 
acted in Vienna, thus France, if it was active in Grey's spirit, would be 
working in St. Petersburg for peace. Of this no trace whatsoever can be 
found. The French Government thus far had not published any series of 
documents concerning its activity during the crisis, and neither in the 
Russian "Orange Book" nor in the English "Blue Book" is anything 
mentioned of the mediatmg activity on the part of France. 

On the contrary, the latter Power, wherever she puts in an appearance — 
as, for instance, in the conversation of the English Ambassador in St. Peters- 
burg with his French colleague and M. Sasanow, as mentioned above — ap- 
pears as fully identical with Russia. It is also stated on July 24: 

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all 
the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia if necessity arose, besides sup- 
porting Russia strongly in all diplomatic negotiations. ... It seems to me from the 
language held by the French Ambassador that even if we decline to join them, France 
and Russia are determined to make a strong stand. — British " White Paper" No. 6. 

One should think that Grey, who in view of this could not possibly 
expect an influence for peace being brought to bear by France, but only a 
strengthening of the Russian desire for aggression, now would have acted 
in the most energetic manner in St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace. 

In reality, however, during the days that still remained, aside from a 
weak, and in St. Petersburg absolutely ineffective, advice to postpone 
mobilization, he did nothing whatsoever, and later placed himself in a manner 
constantly more recognizable on the side of Russia. 

The claim that the time limit given by the Austrian note to Servia was 
the cause of the war, that Grey's mediation had only miscarried owing to 
the haste of Germany, is disproved by the British documents themselves. 
De Bunsen, on July 26, telegraphed to Grey from Vienna: 

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave, thinks that Austro-Hungarian 
Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain 
indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the seilse of your telegram 
of the 25th inst. — British " White Paper" No. 40. 

Therefore Russia has paid little attention to the very shy and timid 
efforts to maintain peace by the British Secretary of State, even where 
these were concerned in the attempt to change the position taken by Austria. 

Another proof: Sasanow on July 27 sent a telegram to the Russian 
Ambassador in London which the latter transmitted to Grey, and which 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 25 

concerns itself with the much-mentioned proposition of the latter to have 
the conflict investigated by a conference of the four great Powers not 
immediately concerned. 

Russian Sincerity Questioned 

The conference plan was declined without much hesitation and openly 
by Germany, because it was compelled to see therein an attempt to place 
Austria before a European court of arbitration, and because it knew the 
serious determination of its ally in this matter. But did Russia really 
want the conference? Minister Sasanow declares: 

I replied to the [British] Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which I hope may be favorable. 
I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for 
revising the note between the two Cabinets. — British " White Paper" No. $j. 

Here it is shown plainly how little the conference plan was after the 
heart of the Russians. Had they accepted it it would have had to be 
done immediately. As soon as the situation had grown very much more 
serious by the failure of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary there 
would have been no more time for this.* 

A telegram of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, dated July 27 
(British "White Paper" No. 55), shows how this conference was expected 
to be conducted in St. Petersburg: 

His Excellency [Sasanow] said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers 
accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch 
with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place. — British " White 
Paper" No. jS- 

Russian shrewdness evidently expected to control the conference by 
keeping in touch with Grey, who, of course, would have been the Chairman. 

* In the aforementioned book of the Oxford historians there is stated on page 69 
(relranslation) : 

This mediation [namely, Grey's mediation proposition] had already been accepted 
b\' Russia on July 25. 

We have shown in the foregoing that the Russian Government did in no manner 
suV)scribe to the conference plan in binding terms. As an additional proof, a part 
of Buchanan's dispatch of the 25th may be mentioned: 

He [Sasanow] would like to see the question placed on an international footing. 
... If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand 
aside and lea\e the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. 
It would be possible in his opinion that Servia might propose to submit the question 
to arbitration. — British " White Paper" No. ij. 

Hence, not if England, but only if Ser\ia would propose arbitration by the 
Powers, Mr. Sasanow was willing! The most amusing part of this is that the Russian 
Minister himself considers such a proposition on the part of Servia merely as 
"possible"; evidently it would have appeared as a great condescension on the part 
of the Government at Belgrade if it, standing on the same basis as Austria-Hungar>', 
would appear before a European tribunal! For us there is no additional proof 
necessary- that a mediation conference, which for Austria was not acceptable even 
when proposed by England, would be unthinkable if the mo\'e for such came from 
Servia. In expressing such an idea, Mr. Sasanow proved that it was his intention 
to brinii war about. 



26 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

The dispatches of his own Ambassadors lying before him should have 
enabled the Secretary of State to see the perfidy of the Russian policy. 
Buchanan wrote on the 28th from St. Petersburg: 

. . . and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance which the 
Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect to Servia's 
integrity and independence. ... In reply, his Excellency stated that if Servia 
were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria 
might take on these two points. . . . — British " White Paper" No. 72. 

Entirely in contrast herewith is one report of the British representative in 
Vienna, dated August i, and speaking of a conversation with the Russian 
Ambassador there: 

Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with 
assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He said that Russia had 
no intention to attack Austria. — British " White Paper" No. 141. 

What, then, may one ask, was the opinion which Sir Edward Grey had 
formed concerning Russia's real intentions? He learns from Russian 
sources and notes faithfully that Russia will accept Austrian guarantees 
for independence of Servia, and also that it will not accept such guarantees. 
It is the same duplicity which Russia, when its own mobilization was 
concerned, showed toward Germany. Did Sir Edward not notice this 
duplicity, or did he not wish to notice it? If the documents of the English 
Government have not been selected with the purpose to confuse, then in 
London the decision to take part in the war does not seem to have been 
a certainty at the beginning. We have seen that Ambassador Buchanan, 
in St. Petersburg, on July 24, gave the Russian Minister to understand that 
England was not of a mind to go to war on account of Servia. This posi- 
tion, taken by the Ambassador, was approved by Sir Edward Grey on the 
following day in the following w^ords: 

I entirely approve what you said . . . and I cannot promise more on behalf of 
the Government. — British " White Paper" No. 24. 

Germany Not To Be Intimidated 

Based upon these instructions. Sir George Buchanan, even on July 27, 
stated to M. Sasanow, who continued to urge England to join Russia and 
France unconditionally : 

I added that you [Grey] could not promise to do anything more, and that his 
Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted 
by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as 
well as with Russia and France if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their 
[the German] attitude would merely be stilTened by such a menace. — British " White 
Paper" No. 44. 

But on this same 27th day of July, Grey, submitting to the intrigues of 
Russian and French diplomacy, had committed one very fateful step 
(telegram to Buchanan, July 27): 

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian 
circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 27 

deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. This impression ought, 
as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the first fleet 
which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland not to disperse for manoeuvre 
leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must 
not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised. — 
British "White Paper" No. 47. 

For Russia this order to the fleet meant very much more than a dip- 
lomatic action. Sasanow saw that the wind in London was turning in his 
favor and he made use of it. Among themselves the Russian diplomatists 
seem to have for a long time been clear and open in their discussion of 
their real object. You find among the documents of the Russian "Orange 
Book" the following telegram of Sasanow of July 25 to the Russian Ambassa- 
dor in London: 

In case of a new aggravation of the situation, possibly provoking on the part of 
the great Powers united action [des actions conformes], we count that England will 
not delay placing herself clearly on the side of Russia and France, with the view 
to maintaining the equilibrium of Europe, in favor of which she has constantly 
intervened in the past, and which would without doubt be compromised in the 
case of the triumph of Austria. — Russian "Orange Paper" No. 77. 

There is no mention of Servia here, but Austria should not triumph. 
Russia's real intention, of course, was not placed so nakedly before the 
British Secretary of State, hence to him the appearance was maintained 
that the little State of the .Save was the only consideration, although the 
Russian army was already being mobilized with all energy. 

On the 28th he wires to the Russian Ambassador, Count Bencken- 
dorff, to London to inform the British Government: 

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other Power to 
make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the 
necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found 
at Berlin. — British " White Paper" No. 54. 

The opinion subtly suggested upon him by Paris and St. Petersburg 
diplomacy, namely, that he should not use any pressure upon Russia, 
but upon Germany, now takes hold of Grey more and more. On July 29 
he writes to the German Ambassador as follows: 

In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany 
thought possible if only Germany would "press the button in the interests of peace." 
—British " White Paper" No. 84. 

St. Petersburg, now assured of the support of Grey, becomes more and 
more outspoken for war. On the 28th, Grey again expressed one of his 
soft-hearted propositions for peace. Mr. Sasanow hardly made the effort 
to hide his contempt. Buchanan telegraphs on the 29th as follows: 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram 
of the 28th inst. was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of 
situation he did not attach weight to it. . . . Minister for Foreign Affairs had given 
me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier im- 
mediately, and a week or more would in any case elapse before mobilization was 
completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation, it was necessary 
that we should in the meanwhile all work together. — British " White Paper" No. 78. 



28 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

Naivete or Cynicism? 

Here it really becomes impossible to judge where the naivete of the 
British Secretary of State ends and cynicism begins, for Sasanow could not 
have told to him more plainly than in these Hues that all Russia's ostensible 
readiness for peace served no other purpose than to win time to complete 
the strategical location of the Russian troops. 

This point is emphaszied by one document coming from a writer pre- 
sumably unbiased, but presumably distrustful of Germany, wherein the 
confirmation is found that England and Russia had come to a full agreement 
during these days. 

On July 30, Belgian Charge d'Affaires de I'Escaille in St. Petersburg 

reported to the Belgian Government upon the European crisis. Owing to 

the fast-developing events of a warlike nature, this letter did not reach 

its address by mail, and it was published later on. The Belgian diplomatist 

writes : 

It is undeniable that Germany tried hard here [that is, in St. Petersburg], and 
in Vienna to find any means whatsoever in order to forestall a general conflict 

And after M. de I'Escaille has told that Russia — what the Czar and his 

War Minister with their highest assurances toward Germany had denied 

— was mobilizing its own army, he continues: 

To-day at St. Petersburg one is absolutely convinced — yes, they have even received 
assurances in that direction — that England and France will stay by them. This 
assistance is of decisive importance and has contributed much to the victory of the 
[Russian] war party. 

This settles Grey's pretended "attempts at mediation." The truth is 
that British politics, decided to prevent a diplomatic success of Germany and 
Austria, now worked openly toward the Russian aim. "The exertion of 
pressure upon Berlin" included already a certain threat, mingled with 
good advice. 

On July 23, Grey had only spoken of four possible Powers in war; 
hence when on the German side some hope of England maintaining neu- 
trality was indulged in, this impression rested upon Grey's own explana- 
tions. On July 29, however, after a political conversation with Prince 
Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, he adds an important per- 
sonal bit of information. He wires concerning it to Berlin, to Goschen: 

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European 
situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, 

something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave But if 

we failed in our efforts to keep the peace and if the issue spread so that it involved 
every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him, that 
the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into 

supposing that we should not take action But we knew very well that 

if the issue did become such that we thought that British interests required us to 
intervene, we must intervene at once and the decision would have to be very rapid. — • 
British "White Paper" No. 89. 

But what is especially wrong is that Grey brought this warning, which 
only could have any effect if it remained an absolute, confidential secret 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 29 

between the English and German Governments, also to the French Am- 
bassador, so that the entire Entente could mischievously look on and see 
whether Germany really would give in to British pressure. Of course, in 
his manner of swaying to and fro, he did not wish either that Cambon 
should not accept this information to the German Ambassador as a decided 
taking of a position on the part of England: 

I thought it necessary [speaking to M. Cambon] to say that because as he knew 
we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet and I was about to warn 
Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, that it would not be fair that 
I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that we had decided what to do 
in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise. . . . — British "White Paper'' 
No. 87. 

Stirring Up Trouble 

On the German side, Grey's open threat, which was presented, how- 
ever, with smooth and friendly sounding words, was received with quiet 
politeness. Goschen telegraphed on the 30th concerning a talk with State 
Secretary ^'on Jagow: 

His Excellency added that the telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night 
contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and, 
at all events, he thoroughly appreciated the frankness and loyalty with which you 
had spoken. — British " White Paper" No. g8. 

Now the work of stirring up trouble is continued unceasingly. On 
July 30, the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, concerning a con- 
versation with the President of the Republic, reports: 

He [Poincare] is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of 
Great Britain. If his Majesty's (iovernment announced that England would come 

to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany 

there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude. — British 
" White Paper" No. gg. 

Did Grey really think for one moment that the German Empire would 
change its position immediately — in other words, would suddenly leave its 
ally in need — or is all this only a mass of diplomatic blandishments? 

On the same day Grey steps from the personal warning which he had 
given to the German Ambassador to the sharpest oflticial threat. In a 
telegram to the Ambassador in Berlin upon the question placed before him 
by the Chancellor of the Empire on the day prior (British "White Paper" 
No. 85), whether England would remain neutral if Germany would bind 
itself, after possible war, to claim no French territory in Europe whatever, 
while in lieu of the French colonies a like guarantee could not be accepted, 
Grey answers with thundering words: 

His Majest3''s Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's 
proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he 
asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and F" ranee 
is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the 
colonies. F"rom a material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France 
without further territory in Europe being taken from her could be so crushed as to 
lose her position as a great Power aad become subordinate to German policy. Alto- 



30 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

gether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with 
Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this 
country could never recover. — British " White Paper" No. loi. 

With this telegram, the war on Germany was practically declared, for 
as a price of British neutraUty an open humihation of Germany was de- 
manded. If France — the question of French colonies is of very minor im- 
portance in this connection — must not be defeated by Germany, then Eng- 
land forbade the German Government to make war. It was furthermore 
stated that Germany was absolutely compelled to accept Russian-French 
dictates, and would have to leave Austria to its own resources. This would 
have meant Germany's retirement from the position of a great Power, even 
if she had backed down before such a challenge. 



III. 
THE AGREEMENT V/ITH FRANCE 

Only in the light of the developments concerning -England's relation 
to France, given at the beginning of the war, Grey's policy, swaying between 
indecision and precipitate action, becomes apparent. 

In all the explanations which the British Government in the course of 
eight years had presented to the British Parliament concerning the relations 
to other large Powers, the assurance had been repeated that no binding 
agreements with the two partners of the Franco-Russian alliance had been 
made, above all, that no agreement with France existed. Only in his speech 
in the House of Commons on August 3, 19 14, which meant the war with 
Germany, Grey gave to the representatives of the people news of certain 
agreements which made it a duty for Great Britain to work together with 
France in any European crisis. 

The fateful document, which in the form of an apparently private letter 
to the French Ambassador, dealt with one of the most important compacts 
of modern history, was written toward the end of the year 1912, and is 
published in the British "White Paper" No. 105, Annex i: 

London, Foreign Office, November 22, 19 12. 
My Dear Ambassador: 

From time to time in recent years, the French and British naval and military 
experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consulta- 
tion does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future 
time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that con- 
sultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement 
that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen 
and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets 
respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate 
in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason 
to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know 
whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. 

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked 
attack, by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should 
immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together 
to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 31 

be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the 
General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments 
would then decide what effect should be given to them. 

Yours etc., 

E. Grey. 
Parliament Deceived 

A few members of the English Parliament who, on August 3, dared to 
protest gingerly against the war, may have had reason to complain about 
the hiding of facts from the House of Commons. When such understandings 
can be made without any one having an idea of their existence, then — so 
far as England is concerned — the supervision of the Government, theo- 
retically being exercised by a Parliament, becomes a fiction. 

As a matter of fact. Grey does not desire to have accepted as political 
obligations the conversations of the French and Enghsh Army and Na\y 
General Staffs concerning the future plans of campaign which took place 
from time to time in times of peace. However, the true tendency of this 
agreement, for such it is, gives itself away in the promise to enter imme- 
diately with France into a political and military exchange of opinions in 
every critical situation; it means in reality nothing less than a veiled de- 
fensive alliance which, by clever diplomatic manipulations, can be changed 
without any difficulty to an offensive one, for inasmuch as the English 
Government promises to consult and work together with France, and conse- 
quently also with its ally, Russia, in every crisis, before a serious investiga- 
tion of the moments of danger, it waives all right of taking an independent 
position. 

How would England ever have been able to enter a war against France 
without throwing upon itself the accusation of faithlessness against one 
with whose plans for war it had become acquainted through negotiations 
lasting through years? 

Here a deviation may be permissible, which leaves for a moment the 
basis of documentary proof. 

If one considers how this agreement of such immeasurable consequences 
was not only hidden from the British Parliament by the Cabinet, but how 
to the very edge of conscious deceit its existence was denied — in the year 
1913 Premier Asquith answered a query of a member of the House of 
Commons that there were no unpublished agreements in existence, which, 
in a case of war between European Powers, would interfere with or limit 
free decision on the part of the British Government or Parliament as to 
whether or not Britain should take part in a war — then certain reports 
making their appearance with great persistency in June, 1Q14, concerning 
an Anglo-Russian naval agreement are seen in a different light. 

Persons who were acquainted with the happenings in diplomacy then 
stated that the Russian Ambassador in Paris, M. Iswolski, during the visit 
which the King of England and Sir Edward Grey were paying to Paris, 
had succeeded in winning the English statesmen for the plan of such an 
agreement. A formal alliance, it was said, was not being demanded by 



32 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

Russia immediately, for good reasons. M. Iswolski was attempting to go 
nearer to his goal, carefully, step by step. 

It had been preliminarily agreed that negotiations should be startea 
between the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attache in London, 
Capt. Wolkow. As a matter of fact, Wolkow, during June went to St. 
Petersburg for a few days to, as was assumed, obtain instructions and then 
return to London. 

Grey's " Twisty " Answer 

These happenings aroused so much attention in England that questions 
were raised in Parliament concerning them. It was noted how twisty 
Grey's answer was. He referred to the answer of the Premier, already 
mentioned, stated that the situation is unchanged, and said then that no 
negotiations were under way concerning a naval agreement with any foreign 
nation. "As far as he was able to judge the matter," no such negotiations 
would be entered into later on. 

The big Liberal newspaper. The Manchester Guardian, was not at all 
satisfied with this explanation; it assumed that certain conditional pre- 
liniinary agreements might not be excluded. 

This Russian plan, which was later worked out in St. Petersburg, went 
into oblivion on account of the rapidly following European War. In the 
light of the following revelation of Grey's agreement with France, the news 
of the naval agreement desired by Iswolski assumed another aspect. 

Let us return to the Anglo-French agreement. The following remarks 
by the French Ambassador in London, reported by Grey, proves that, on 
the ground of this agreement, France, with very little trouble, would be 
able to make out of a diplomatic entanglement a case for the Allies' 
interest as far as England is concerned. 

A German "Attack" 

He [Cambon] anticipated that the [German] aggression would take the form 
of either a demand to cease her preparations or a demand that she should engage 
to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these 
things would France admit. — British "White Paper" No. 105. 

Therefore, even the demand addressed to^ France not to, jointly with 
Russia, attack Germany, became a German "attack," which obliged Eng- 
land to come to the aid! 

In spite of this, even on July 27, in a conversation with Cambon, Grey 
gave himself the appearance as if his hands were free. He told the French- 
man: 

If Germany became involved and France became involved we had not made 

up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider 

We were free from engagements and we should have to decide what British interests 
required us to do. — British " White Paper" No. 87. 

M. Cambon remarked in reply that the Secretary of State had clearly 
pictured the situation, but on the very following day the French Ambassador 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 7,7, 

took the liberty to remind Grey of the letter written in 191 2 (British "White 

Paper" No. 105). 

Grey did not deny the claim implied in this reminder, but even as late 

as July 3 1 he reports as follows concerning the conversation with Cambon : 

Up to the present moment we did not feel, and public opinion. did not feel, that 
any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. . . . M. Cambon repeated 
his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. 
I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, 
we could not take any engagement. ... I said that the Cabinet would certainly 
be summoned as soon as there was some new development; that at the present 
moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite 
engagement. — British "White Paper" No. iig. 

Now, if we remember that even on the day before Grey had informea 
the German Imperial Chancellor it would be a shame for England to 
remain neutral and allow France to be crushed, we here find a new proof 
of the unreliability of his conduct. If he has been gullible, the declaration 
of 191 2, the dangerous character of which is increased by its apparently 
undefined tenor, has enmeshed him more and more. Also the military and 
naval circles, whose consultations with the representatives of the French 
Army and Na\^' certainly have been continued diligently since the beginning 
of the Servian crisis, were forcing toward a decision. 

At all events it became more impossible with every hour for Germany 

to keep England out of the war by any offers whatsoever. This is proved 

by Grey's conversation of August i with the German Ambassador: 

He asked me whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neu- 
trality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; 
our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. . . . 
The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which 
we would remain neutral. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise. 
. . . — British "White Paper" No. 123. 

Belgium Not the Cause 

Hence, only if Germany would permit herself to be humiliated, war with 

England could be avoided. The \dolation of Belgium's neutrality was in no 

way the cause of England joining Germany's enemies, for while German 

troops did not enter Belgium until the night from August 3 to 4, Grey gave 

on August 2 the following memorandum to the French Ambassador after 

a session of the Cabinet in London: 

I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the 
Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French 
coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. — British 
"White Paper" No. 148. 

As the aim of this decision, of which M. Cambon was informed verbally, 
was to give France an assurance that it would be placed in a position "to 
settle the disposition of its own Mediterranean fleet," Grey would not 
accept the version of Cambon that England would take part in a war with 
Germany. This is a case of splitting hairs in order to put the blame of 
starting the war on Germany, for while England promised to protect the 
French coast and to make it possible for the French fleet to stay in the 



34 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

Mediterranean, she almost immediately proceeded to a warlike action 
against Germany, especially as the English Minister simultaneously refused 
to bind himself to maintain even this peculiar neutrality. 



IV. 
BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 

The highest representatives of the German Empire, with emphatic 
seriousness, declared that it was with a heavy heart and only following the 
law of self-preservation that they decided to violate the neutrality of the 
Kingdom of Belgium, guaranteed by the great Powers in the Treaties of 
1831 and 1839. 

The German Secretary of State, on August 4, informed the English 

Government, through the embassy in London, that Germany intended to 

retain no Belgian territory, and added: 

Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that the German Army could not be exposed to 
French attack across Belgium, which was planned, according to absolutely unim- 
peachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, 
it being with her a question of life or death to prevent French advance. — British 
" White Paper" No. 157. 

In answer, Grey caused the English Ambassador in Berlin to demand his 
passports and to tell the German Government that England would take 
all steps for defence of Belgian neutrality. 

This, therefore, represents, in the view which very cleverly has been 
spread broadcast by British publicity, the real reason for the war. But in 
spite of the moral indignation that is apparent against Germany, the con- 
sideration for Belgium, up until very late, does not seem in any way to 
have been in the foreground. We find, on July 3 1 , Grey stated to Cambon : 

The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a 
decisive, but an important, factor in determining our attitude. — British ^^ White 
Paper" No. iig. 

Here, therefore, there was no talk about England grasping the sword on 
account of Belgium. Now no one will claim that the assumption that the 
German troops could march through Belgium would be new or unheard of. 
For years this possibility had been discussed in military literature.* 

A Sudden Decision 

It must also be assumed that the Belgian Government knew toward the 
end of July at the latest that the war between Germany and France was 
probable and the march of Germans through Belgium very possible. 

* The book, which appeared at Oxford, "Why We Are at War," mentioned 
previously, states on page 27 (retranslation) : 

That such a plan [the marching through Luxemburg and Belgium] had been 
taken into consideration by the Germans, has been known in England generally 
for several years; and it has also been generally accepted that the attempt to carry 
out this plan would bring about the active resistance of the British armed forces; 
one assumed that these would be given the task of assisting the left wing of the 
French, which would have to resist German advance from Belgian territory. 

This expression on the part of the historical Faculty is very interesting. It shows 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 35 

If England had not taken part in the war against Germany, it ma\- be 

assumed that it would have given Belgium the advice to permit the marching 

through of the German Army, somewhat in the same manner as the Grand 

Duchy of Luxemburg did, with a protest. In doing so the Belgian people 

would have been spared a great deal of misery and loss of blood. On 

August 3, the Belgian Government replied to an offer of military help 

by France as follows: 

We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering exentuai sup- 
port. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the 
guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Oovernment will decide later on the action which 
they may think necessary to take. — British " White Paper" No. 151. 

One day later London decided to make Belgian neutrality the cause of 

the war against Germany before the eyes of the world. The Ambassador 

in Brussels received the following orders: 

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them 
by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government 
expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that his Majesty's 
Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's 
Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France. — British " White 
Paper'" No. 155. 

Not until England thus stirred Belgium up, holding out the deceptive 
hope of effective French and English help, did Belgian fanaticism break 
loose against Germany. Without the intervention of England in Brussels 
the events in Belgium, one may safely assert, would have taken an entirely 
different course, which would have been far more favorable to Belgium. 

But, of course, England had thus found a very useful reason for war 
against Germany. Even on the 31st of July, Grey had spoken of the viola- 
tion of Belgian neutrality as not a decisive factor. On August i, he declined 
to promise Prince Lichnowsky England's neutrality, even if Germany would 
not violate Belgium's neutrality. On August 4, however, the Belgian 
question was the cause that suddenly drove England to maintain the moral 
fabric of the world and to draw the sword. 

This suddenly became the new dcA^elopment, which was still lacking for 
Grey in order to justify this war before public opinion in England. 

Another English Advantage 

And something else was secured by the drawing of Belgium into the war 
by the British Government, which had decided to make war on Germany for 
entirely different reasons: the thankful part of the protector of the weak 
and the oppressed. 

As an English diplomat, when Russia was mobilizing, openly stated, the 
interests of his country in Servia were nil, so for Grey even Belgium, imme- 
diately before the break with Germany, was not decisive. However, 
■when England had irrevocably decided to enter the war, it stepped out before 
the limelight of the world as the champion of — the small nations. 

that a plan of campaign between the English and French had long been considered, and 
that the Belgian entry into the alliance against Germany was a matter agreed upon. 



GERMANY AND THE POWERS 

{From "The North American Bevieiv," December, 1914) 

When, like a stroke of lightning from a serene blue heaven, the world 
war broke out in Europe, Americans stood dumfounded, amazed, and 
horrified. All the attainments of twentieth-century civilization seemed to 
crumble under their very feet. All the endeavors that had been made to 
settle international dufficulties by treaties or arbitration seemed to be 
absolutely futile. All the protestations that the various peoples of Europe 
had been making continuously for peace and good-will were discredited. 
It was not so much the resentment against the disturbance of trade, the 
stopping of exports, and inconvenience of unbalanced financial relations, 
the anxiety for a host of relatives and friends who had been entrapped 
in the warring countries, that roused this American feeling; the public 
on this side was deeply hurt in its ethical feeling, in its moral attitude, 
toward solemn obligations, in its sympathies for smaller nations. What 
was all that civilization that the world had been boasting of so much? 
What did the word "culture" mean if from one day to the next Europe 
could become the field of brutality, burning, and sacking? Was not the 
world thrown back for a century or more, and were not all the sincere en- 
deavors to bring about a more human state of things by international 
treaties permanently in danger by this spectacle of treaties being dis- 
regarded and torn to shreds? What would all this mean for the United 
States? Had she not let herself be inveigled into a spirit of security, into 
an optimism without foundation, into the hope for a better and more 
peaceful world? 

The breaking out of the war was considered here as a crime against 
humanity, and it cannot be wondered at that the next question was. Who 
was the author of that crime? Who permitted it, by act of tolerance, to be 
perpetrated? The answer seemed to come quickly on irrefutable evidence. 
The brutality of the Austrian ultimatum; the failure of Germany to repress 
her ally; the Russian feeling for the small boundary states; the French 
resentment of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine; the English attitude 
toward guaranteed treaties — all seemed to be a chain of evidence that laid 
the blame to the door of Germany, and Germany did not defend herself 
because she could not — being deprived of direct communication in con- 
sequence of the cutting of cables and the stringent British rules against the 
printing of uncensored news. 

So the judgment was quickly formed. It could only be formed on the 

36 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 37 

evidence presented, one-sided though it was. And, in the absence of 
facts, Americans had to rely on sentiment which strongly favored the Allies. 

The greater the American nation has become the more it has built uj) a 
civilization of its own. The more intense national life has grown, the less 
Americans have had reason to busy themselves with the happenings in far- 
away countries, and as little as it can be expected that the men in the 
interior of Russia should know anything of American institutions and 
statecraft, as little can it be fairly demanded that Americans should be 
intimately acquainted with the intricacies of European politics. 

Therefore it may not be amiss to try to sketch the state of things in 
Europe as it has been, the various peoples involved, their aims, ambitions, 
and necessities, the driving forces behind them, and the historical develop- 
ment that resulted in the explosion. 

The 'immediate cause was the trouble between Austria and Servia. 
Servia has played the foremost part in the Balkans, as Professor Sloane 
in his remarkable book, ''The Balkans, a Historical Laboratory," has 
pictured. A strong and valorous people, dominated mostly by its clans, 
practically without industry, a peasant nation, continuously engaged for 
centuries in fights for national existence and in internal strife for the suprem- 
acy of the great chieftains. Expansi^'e, as all the Slav peoples, Ser\'ia 
has sought for many years to enlarge her territory. There were two 
possibilities: either at the expense of Turkey or at the expense of Austria- 
Hungary, in whose confines several millions of Serbs are living. ''AH 
Slavs are brethren" — that is the doctrine. All Slavs must be under Slavish 
rulers, and all territory inhabited by Serbs is part of an unalienable in- 
heritance of the Servian kingdom. So, a "Greater Servia" has been the 
aim of a people who had not many cultural goods to defend, no great 
wealth to effeminate them, frugal and warlike as they were. In order not 
to go back too deep into history, I would refer my readers to the Balkan 
Alliance, consisting of two treaties, the one between Servia and Bulgaria 
of February 29, 191 2, and the second between Greece and Bulgaria of 
May 16, 191 2. These treaties contain secret clauses that were published 
in 1913 in Le Matin of Paris. These secret clauses provide for a division 
of the Balkans between Servia and Bulgaria on a north-southerly line, 
leaving the western part to Servia, the eastern part to Bulgaria. The 
open part of the treaty provides for a purely defensive alliance; the secret 
part shows the aims and the element that has been dominant in the bringing 
about of that alliance, directed, as to Servia, against Austria, and as to 
Bulgaria, against Turkey. This dominant factor is Russia. Article 
First of the secret clauses says: 

That if Servia and Bulgaria convene to act, it is to be communicated to Russia, 
and if Russia does not oppose itself, the action will proceed. If they cannot agree 
as to an action, they will apply to Russia, whose decision will be obligatory upon 
both parties. Should Russia not give any opinion at all and the two parties cannot 
concert, that party that will undertake an action must proceed alone, the other 
keeping in friendly neutrality supported by partial mobilization. 



38 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

Article Three says: 

A copy of this treaty and of its secret clauses will be jointly communicated to 
the Russian Government, which will be asked to take note of it, and to give proof 
of its good-will regarding the ends sought, and the Emperor of Russia will be asked 
to kindly accept and approve for his person and his Government the role assigned 
to them in the treaty. All differences that should result from the interpretation 
or execution of the treaty are to be submitted to the definite decision of Russia. 

And Article Five says: 

This appendix is not to be published without the consent of Russia. 

Thus it will be seen Russia was able to pull the strings, and she did. 
When Italy seized upon Tripoli, and the Turkish fleet was engaged with the 
Italian navy that took possession of a number of islands in the ^gean, the 
war was started against Turkey, and it looked for a moment as if she were 
to be driven out of Europe altogether. But Bulgaria aspired for more of 
the conquered territory than Russia was willing to concede, for reasons we 
shall see hereafter, and a new war broke out between Servia and Greece 
on the one side, and Bulgaria on the other. Bulgaria was brought very near 
to destruction; then the Czar of Bulgaria addressed himself for help to 
Austria. It was at this juncture that Russia saw fit to publish the secret 
clause of the treaty showing that Bulgaria had conspired with her and with 
Servia to fight Austria. Peace was finally concluded in Bucharest — a peace 
that was not to the satisfaction of Austria. She tried to engage Germany 
in her attempt to annul the Bucharest protocol — which Germany refused 
to do, although thereby greatly grieving her ally, in the interests of the 
peaceful people of the world. So Servia attained her end in about doubling 
her size; but the spirit of conquest cannot be repressed once it has started 
and has been successful. The Servian aim had been to gain free access 
to a harbor on the Adriatic. Austria had opposed herself, the Greater 
Servian dream remained still unfulfilled, and Servia now directed her 
attention to the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because 
the Austrian interests in the western part of the Balkans barred Servia's 
way to the sea. Then those conspiracies set in, sowing discord among 
Austrian peoples, inveigling into mutiny Austrian subjects, swamping 
Bosnia and the south of Hungary with Servian literature; it ended in the 
murder of the Crown Prince of Austria and his wife on June 28, and nobody 
who knew anything at all of the doings in the Balkans could have the 
slightest doubt that Servia only tackled her big neighbor because of the 
promise of Russia to stand by her, as was evidenced by the treaty above 
cited. The aims of Servia are commensurate with the nature of her people, 
with the state of her culture, with the ambitions of her statesmen. 

But why did Russia countenance all that? Among all the Slav peoples 
Russia has been the most restive for ages. She has added to her dominions 
constantly and is now the empire of the greatest territorial extension. She 
is autocratic, and she must keep the minds of her people busy. It is from 
her soil that all the hordes have ever penetrated into Europe, from the times 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 39 

of Ghengis-Khan and Timur-i-leng — Mongols, Tartars, and Poles. She 
has spread out east and south, her efforts always alternating in the two 
directions — an enormous empire that is turning now its efforts toward 
the building up of an industry. Having been defeated in the East in 1904, 
unable to retrieve her defeat by Japan in consequence of the British alliance 
with Japan, and being handicapped in the efforts to reach the Indian 
Ocean by the British-Russian compact of 1907, she again turned her eyes 
to the south. World-commerce and world-power are no longer confined to 
continents. Any considerable export trade demands access to the sea, a 
mercantile marine, and a certain liberty of movement. Look how she is 
situated in that respect! This enormous empire, the largest -on earth, has 
not even one outlet to the sea accessible at all times of the year. Her 
northern harbor. Archangel, is icebound as early as September. It is con- 
nected with its industrial center only by one single-track line of more than a 
thousand miles. The harbor of Kronstadt is equally icebound in the winter, 
and it is, moreover, only a harbor to the Baltic, that is dominated by 
Germany. A third harbor, Vladivostok, on the far Japan Sea, is of no 
account, freezing up also very early in the year. Her attempt to get into 
the Chinese Sea by way of Port Arthur has been finally frustrated, by Japan 
forcing Russia to retire from it in 1904, when equally she lost her chance of 
reaching out by way of Korea. But all the strong Northern peoples have 
always had their eyes on more clement climates, and there has been from 
time immemorial a constant pressing of Gauls and Teutons, of Slavs and 
Mohammedan Indians, toward the ocean to the south. But here again 
Russia finds herself absolutely barred. All attempts to get free access to 
the Mediterranean have invariably come to naught. The Powers inter- 
ested in the Mediterranean did not want another strong Power to com- 
pete with them there, or to menace their domination. So Russia in her 
attempts to break the Turkish rule in the Dardanelles has always been 
opposed by the rest of Europe. The Crimean War was waged in 1854 
against Russia by the combined forces of Turkey, France, and England, 
and ended in the Paris protocol, re-establishing the control of Turkey over 
the Bosporus, and forbidding any men-of-war to pass by Constantinople. 
When, by the help of Rumania, Russia was victorious in 1878 and forced 
upon Turkey the treaty of San Stefano, dictating its terms under the very 
doors of Constantinople, Europe interceded, and Russia was thrown back 
by the Congress of Berlin, and her efforts were again frustrated. But in 
1908 she addressed herself to Austria for a revision of the Paris Treaty 
of 1856. Austria, while amenable to Russian demands, made her assent 
contingent upon French and English consent, and these two Powers did 
not see their way to satisfy her. 

So the national tendency of Russia to get to Constantinople, and the 
Servian ambitions to get an outlet to the Adriatic strengthened the natural 
political tie between the countries. Now it is easily understood why Bul- 
garia was not permitted to press forward to Constantinople, or to gain a 



40 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

great addition to her power. Once on the Bosporus a "Greater Bulgaria" 
would prove an unsafe factor to the Russian aims; therefore, Bulgaria was 
first called back and then defeated with Russian assistance. 

What was Austria's interest in this game? Her trade is mostly Oriental. 
Wherever the Russians go, the open door is closed. The looming up of a 
big Power on the southerly frontier meant the tearing from her of the 
Slav parts — a very great danger that in fact necessitated, as every one 
knows, a huge addition to the Austrian and German armaments in 19 13. She 
could not split up her Slav parts without falling all to pieces. There are 
Rumanians in the east of Hungary; there are Serbs on the Hungarian 
frontier on the Danube; there are a great many of the same population in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina; and then, also, the great Bohemian crown land for 
the most part is Slav. She had a large interest in maintaining her treatv 
rights with Turkey. She knew of the relentless hatred of the Serbs, who 
could not enlarge their frontiers to the West, and the known Russian 
enmity that barred her way to the JEgesui Sea. Austria's situation became 
unbearable, and the assassination of Serajevo was just a spark that fell 
into the powder-cask. 

But could Germany forsake Austria in her struggle for life that she had 
to take up? In the first place, Germany had been the ally of Austria ever 
since 1879, for the avowed purpose of preventing Russian aggression. Then 
Austria is not only peopled with Slav and Hungarians — she is also a 
German nation^more than twelve million of her people (about 25 per cent.) 
being German by race, by language, and by civilization. The partition of 
Austria would have left that great part of the real kernel and backbone of 
the Dual Monarchy in a hopelessly impotent and reduced position, sur- 
rounded on two sides by people of a different race, inferior cultural attain- 
ments, and an easy prey to either of the contending factors. If the bonds 
of nationality, of language and culture, count for anything, Germany could 
not do that. And then, for her, there is another consideration of equal 
importance: Germany is a nation of fast-increasing population. She is 
industrial for the most part. She can keep her people busy at home only 
by having the markets of the world open to German goods. The closing of 
the Bosporus by Russia would have excluded her enterprise forever from 
Western Asia, where she has been doing so much cultural work, and would 
have left the enormous Asiatic Continent to be further divided by England 
and Russia. All her just endeavors to peaceful commercial expansion 
would have been thwarted. On the other hand, the breaking up of Austria 
would have meant a complete isolation of Germany, with the enormous dan- 
ger of an array of the Powers against her as seen in this war. So when 
Austria had to fight, as she had, Germany had to join with her. 

We now come to the situation of France. It is said that she is fighting 
for revenge, and revenge is generally interpreted as retribution for the 
taking of Alsace-Lorraine. But that is only the outward sign of the decay 
of French power. For hundreds of years France had been the foremost 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 41 

Power of the European Continent. She was dictating its politics, she dom- 
inated the cabinets of Europe, from the times of Richelieu and Louis XIV. ; 
from the time of Mazarin to the French Revolution; from Napoleon I. 
to Talleyrand's splendid work at the Vienna Congress and as Ambassador 
at the Court of St. James's, down to finally Napoleon III., the French 
Court was always the focus of splendor, might, and imperiousness. France 
has been, as she styles herself always, la grande nation, and it was a rude 
awakening and a terrible disappointment when the power of United Ger- 
many definitely removed her from that position. Given to good living and 
comfort, and to the two-children system, she continuously lost ground as 
against parsimonious, frugal, and inventive Germany. The well-known ten- 
dency of Germany for family life and the raising of children under the home 
roof made the difference in population every year greater. Thirty-eight 
millions in 1780 in France and a like number in Germany changed into 
thirty-nine millions in the former and into nearly seventy millions in the 
latter country. So she felt that she could not hold her own single-handedly, 
and she had to seek alliances which were not to be had for the asking. She 
found an ally in the Russian antagonism toward Germany that had sprung 
up ever since Bismarck had made himself the "honest broker" of Europe 
at the Berlin Congress, when the prize of her war against Turkey was 
definitely wrested from her. France had to engage to finance Russian rail- 
ways, Russian state needs, and Russian armament. She had to loan to 
Russia more than ten billion francs of her savings in order to maintain that 
friendship. So there were two motives that caused France to draw nearer 
and nearer to Russia and to become the bonded ally to a Power so foreign 
to French culture and French ideals. The first motive was to regain her 
lost position in Europe. The second was the fear of losing her savings in- 
vested in Russia. Had she stood out, Russia would not have hesitated to 
cancel all her indebtedness to France by a single stroke of her autocratic 
pen. It was this sort of entanglement that brought France into this Euro- 
pean war. 

Let us come to England. 

It has been maintained that her jealousy against German trade, Ger- 
man sea power, German industry, and German expansion had been guiding 
factors. They had certainly a very great deal to do with the public feeling 
in England, and it is public sentiment to which Great Britain, more than 
any other nation, thinks she must listen. Sir Edward Grey, in a dispatch, 
on August I (reprinted under No. 123 of the English "White Book"), to 
Sir Edward Goshen, makes clear this point. He says that the German 
attitude with regard to Belgium affected feeling in England. If Germany 
could give the same assurance as France had given, it would materially con- 
tribute to relieve anxiety and tension in England. If Belgian neutralit\ 
was violated, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in 
that country. "He [Count Lichnowsky] asked me whether if Germany 
would promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain 



42 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

neutral. I replied that I could not say that. . . . Our attitude would be 
determined largely by public opinion." He did not think that they could 
give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. The German Ambas- 
sador pressed him as to whether he could not formulate conditions on which 
England would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of 
France and her colonies might be guaranteed, but Sir Edward Grey said 
that he felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on 
similar terms, and that England must keep her hands free. 

It is clear that public opinion in England, while being strongly influenced 
by the Belgian case, had other grudges against Germany. That is why Sir 
Edward Grey would not even formulate conditions to remain neutral if 
Belgian neutrality was being guaranteed. I wonder why this significant 
despatch is always disregarded by the Americans formulating a case against 
Germany. While it is true that this British-German rivalry certainly 
played a very considerable part in the policy of the British Cabinet, I do 
not think that it was decisive. The English policy for ages past, adapted to 
the isolation of the British Isles, has been the maintenance of European 
equilibrium, by which is meant that England saw to it that Europe was 
arrayed into two hostile camps, as equally matched as possible, while she 
kept her hands free in order to throw her weight into the balance of that 
party that served her aims best. Therefore, when France had to go to 
war as soon as Russia became involved, she was in great fear that this 
equilibrium might be seriously disturbed. I believe Sir Edward Grey wanted 
peace under existing conditions; the equilibrium was there, and England 
had nothing to complain of. But if war was to be declared, France being 
much the weaker, it was to be expected that she would be thoroughly crushed 
by the German war machine and the equilibrium would have gone for good. 
Even if France was not despoiled of any of her provinces or possessions, yet 
she would have been materially so much weakened that she could not play 
any further part in the European concert. So England's interest was 
bound up with France remaining a comparatively strong Power. And so, 
with eyes always on that point, England became entangled beyond what 
she ever expected. As early as November 22, 191 2, Sir Edward Grey, 
without the knowledge of the Cabinet, exchanged letters with the French 
Ambassador, acknowledging an arrangement whereby the entire French 
fleet was sent to the Mediterranean to protect the joint interests there 
while the English fleet was concentrated in the North Sea. This arrange- 
ment could not be changed when the war broke out. Sir Edward Grey said 
that much in a speech on August 3 in the House of Commons. He was 
bound to protect the French coasts and had to see to it that the French were 
not being reduced. It will now be understood why the English always talk 
of the necessity of reducing Germany to a second-rate Power by crushing 
out her military force. That is the only way by which France can be 
strengthened and England can return to her former policy. She was afraid 
of German expansion, as of the German inroads into English trade. But 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 43 

that was not paramount. Paramount was the English interest of re-estab- 
Hshing a state of things such as had been the case before 1870. She knows 
that her next big struggle will be with Russia over her Asiatic possessions, 
and must keep her hands free for that, and be reassured of the state of 
Europe. Therefore, no matter what happened before war broke out, as 
soon as it was certain to come she had to be a party to it. 

I stated the case of Germany as I proceeded. I have now to speak of 
three Powers that play a smaller role in the conflict: First, , there is Japan. 
Next to Russia, Japan has been the most expansive Power, and since 1894 
has acquired possession and control of three times what she had before 
that date. She is now out for the coast of China, pretending to fight the 
Germans in Kiaochow, while at the same time taking possession of all the 
railways from Peking south to the valley of the Yangtse. She means to 
dominate that part of China, just as she dominates the southern part of 
Manchuria, by controlling all the lines of communication, fortifying her 
position along those railways by putting in garrisons under the name of 
"railway guards," and definitely ousting European competition that can- 
not be maintained against the craft and frugality of the yellow man. That 
is a side issue whose bearing upon America I do not feel called upon to 
detail. 

Then there is Portugal. Here there is a remarkable double play. While 
England is apparently assisting the Republic of Portugal and egging her 
on to go to war, by telling her that German expansion means a loss of Por- 
tuguese colonies, she is harboring at the same time in her confines the ex- 
King of Portugal; is the center of the royalist revolutionary movements 
against Portugal, and she feels assured that whichever way this struggle 
turns she will have all the advantage. 

Then I come to the case of Belgium, that made so much stir in the 
United States. She, also, is not to be exonerated from blame. Belgium 
feels much safer as a buffer state in the interests of England, who, she 
believed, would maintain her independence and integrity, as England can- 
not permit any first-class Power to control the entrance to the North Sea. 
Belgium belongs geographically to Germany. So by playing upon Belgian 
fear that she, whose main harbor, Antwerp, is a natural outlet to the growing 
German industries, would become a German vassal, and by promising 
Belgium British help, assisting her in her fortifications, she made Belgium 
resist the two overtures of the German Chancellor, who promised integrity 
and indemnity in case Germany marched through Belgium. I will not 
dwell here on the treaty relations which Mr. Gladstone himself called a 
most complicated affair, and which he thought must not be maintained 
if they were against English interests, at the time when the occasion of 
acting under the guarantee arose. It was Great Britain's interest that this 
neutrality should be kept, but it was certainly not England's reason for the 
war, as is made clear by the dispatch of Sir Edward Grey cited above. 

The German Government has been taxed with considering treaties as 



44 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

"scraps of paper." That is certainly not the German record, nor the 
German position toward treaties. But this treaty was a scrap of paper; 
the English on their side did not put any faith in it, nor were they prepared 
to maintain it under all circumstances. They did not consider it enforceable 
in 1870, and replaced it by new arrangements between the North German 
Confederation and France. The Chancellor regretted very much that he 
had to go through Belgium, although Belgium had broken that treaty her- 
self in spirit and in letter. The American doctrine is that treaty obligations 
must not and cannot be kept if it is against public policy {vide unanimous 
judgment rendered in the Chinese Exclusion Treaty cases by the United 
States Supreme Court, printed in Vol. 130 of U. S. Reports, page 600). And 
I must say that it is one thing to ask a private individual to keep an obli- 
gation, even when suffering great loss and inconvenience, and another if a 
statesman responsible for sixty-six million people who are in danger of 
losing their liberty, national existence, and civil rights takes upon himself 
to encounter criticism by the world at large. Belgian neutrality was an 
instrument played very skilfully by Sir Edward Grey as a moral proposi- 
tion. In fact, it was a proposition of public interest also for England, and 
neutrality had to be protected if England wanted to retain a dominant 
position on both sides of the Channel. 

Then there is another aspect of the matter that Americans generally 
overlook. They always talk of Germany and Russia and the other countries 
as doing such and such things. They talk of statesmen having acted so or 
otherwise. They forget that behind these statesmen, behind these coun- 
tries, there are hundreds of millions of people who have a life and a volition 
of their own. They forget that most of these States are guided and con- 
ducted by sets of people who do not appear very much in the foreground. 
The Servian people by itself has probably not been very willing to go to 
war again after the experience of 191 2. There was a Crown Prince who was 
the real ruler behind the throne, and the military and clan party who, as 
it is now proven beyond any possibility of refutation, engineered a plot 
against the Crown Prince of Austria, spread a large propaganda, and drove 
the people to war by telling them that Austria wanted to exterminate the 
Servian people, notwithstanding the explicit guarantee of Austria that she 
would not take any Servian territory. The same is the case in Russia. 
The Russian people are very illiterate and uncultivated. Seventy out of 
one hundred Russians do not know how to read and write. They do not 
read papers. They follow the dictates of their clergy, the call of their 
"white" Czar, and implicitly believe what they are told. There is a mili- 
tary clique in Russia that has been constantly pressing upon the peaceful 
Czar that now was the time to get, all the things they had wanted for so 
long. The Czar refused, and closed himself up for four days. The Minister 
of War was not in the councils of the war party, so it happened that the 
Russian mobilization went forward without the Czar's signature and after 
the Minister of War had s:i^'en his word of honor that no mobilization had 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 45 

been ordered. This Grand-Ducal party finally got the upper hand, as re- 
ported by the Belgian Minister in St. Petersburg on July 30 to his home 
Government, after having received the assurance that England would 
second France in case of a conflict. And this was before the Belgian incident 
ever arose. 

Similar conditions obtained in Austria. The Archduke Francis Ferdi- 
nand had always cherished the plan of reconciling the Slav portion of the 
Empire by making out of the dual Monarchy a tripartite arrangement. 
Hungary, that would thereby lose most, was much against it. So when 
the Archduke was out of the way and the Hungarian Premier pressed for a 
more determined policy, the old Emperor was not able to make the same 
strong resistance. 

And the same holds good also in respect to England. Sir Edward Grey 
never communicated the exchange of letters with the French Ambassador in 
191 2 to his colleagues. But when this matter could no longer be kept back, 
the Cabinet was amazed. Three of its members stepped out at once, de- 
claring that they would not have anything more to do with the Govern- 
ment. They were Mr. John Burns, Lord Morley, and Mr. Trevelyan, who 
in a letter to his constituents in Ellford declared that they had always been 
told that the hands of England were entirely free, that they were not 
obligated to France in any way, but that he had found out, to his disgust, 
that England was so hopelessly entangled that she had to go to war. The 
leader of the Socialist party, Ramsay McDonald, most severely criticized 
the Administration upon the same grounds, and the Liberal member of 
Parliament, Mr. Arthur Ponsonby, wrote a letter most severely arraigning 
Sir Edward Grey on his double dealing. But there were some hotheads, like 
Winston Churchill and Lloyd-George, and then there was the enormous 
danger of the Irish civil struggle that loomed up on the horizon and whose 
consequences could absolutely not be foreseen in a time of European con- 
flagration. The Irish leaders were induced, by the passing of. a Home Rule 
Bill of a very deceptive kind, to come to the aid of the Government, upon 
the ground of patriotism and national danger. 

The only nation that is absolutely united to its Government is Germany. 
She knows, and it will be apparent to any thoughtful reader of the above 
recital, that all the nations around her want something of her — have an 
interest in the struggle, and are wiUing to fight under all circumstances. 
Russia wants Constantinople and the weakening of the Austrian Monarchy; 
England demands the reduction of Germany to a subordinate Power; France, 
the re-establishment of her former dominating rule of Europe. Surely, no 
one would consider Germany so insane and absolutely bereft of common 
sense that she should have desired and permitted all the nations in whose 
way she had been to fall on her, thereby catering for her own destruction? 
Will it be believed that a nation that has been constantly striving for peace, 
the only one of all European nations that has not had war for forty-four 
years, has never expanded except peacefully, never acquired territory ex- 



46 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

cept by treaty, knowing that a combination of much stronger Powers 
threatened her from all sides, would go wilfully and hght-heartedly to fight 
nearly the whole world? And what had she to gain if she were victorious? 
So I put my case, not on doubtful evidence, or on the teachings of people 
who want to make believe to the American public that diplomacy is the 
school of truthfulness and that diplomatic papers are a clean source of in- 
formation, but I put my case, and I rest it, on the history of Europe, on 
the forces that have been at work, not since the 28th of July, but for many 
years past, whose self-interest I have made evident and whose powers, aims, 
and ambitions are explained — an explanation which the average American 
scholar will be able to verify every day. Germany is united because she 
knows that she is fighting for her very life and existence, and against Powers 
who wish to reduce her to her former state of impotency and weakness and 
to undo the great work of Bismarck, to crush, under Slav dictation, forces 
that have been a boon to the civilization and advancement of the world. 



THE TIES THAT BIND AMERICA AND GERMANY 

The Great Infusion of German Blood in the American People, the Common 
Commercial Interests of the Two Nations, and Their Intellectual Fraternity 

To all thinking people the great European War is not only of interest 
as a matter of contemporaneous history, as a touchstone of ethics and 
civilization, but it leads them of necessity to the consideration as to what 
the bearing of the struggle or its possible outcome may mean to the people 
of the United States. The whole net-work of international relations has 
been exposed by the various warring factions trying to explain to themselves 
and to the rest of the world the reasons that have brought this conflagration 
about. The undercurrents of international diplomatic action have been 
laid bare, and matters are brought to the public attention in America that 
seemed until now very foreign to the actual struggle. Happily, however, 
the American people can congratulate themselves that they are not directly 
concerned in the war, and it is as intelligible as it is wise that they should 
try to avoid to be drawn into the difficulty at all. Yet as in a physical per- 
son the ailing of one limb affects the well-being of the whole body, so any 
disturbance of a considerable part of the European Continent must needs 
afifect the rest of the world. Modern development has made it clear that 
all real efficiency rests on a di\dsion of energies and functions adapted to a 
particular purpose and to the genius of the parts working together to 
reach a certain specified end. As in the work-shop of any individual, this 
holds good in that enormous workshop of the world. It applies not only to 
the production and exchange of commodities; it also applies to the ethical 
and spiritual field. The relations of the various peoples, the scientific as 
well as the commercial intercourse between them, is now being very seri- 
ously disturbed, and since ever^- responsible mind feels called upon to inves- 
tigate this disturbance, it cannot fail that a certain revision even of the 
f:;elings and tendencies must occur. So there has been everywhere in the 
United States, while the people were honestly trying to come to a fair 
judgment and preserve full neutrality, such a revision of sentiment: one 
party favoring more the success of the Allies, the other wishing the German 
cause to prevail. To deepen the sentiment, and to justify it, people dug 
into history, because history alone gives a clue to the logical development 
of present-day situations. So I propose in this article to trace the history 
of German-American relations, showing the bonds that so firmly hold 
together sympathies as well as interest between the two countries. 

Next to Germany itself, no country on earth — even not excepting 
Austria — has so much German blood infused into it as the United States. 
While in Austria there are just about twelve million people speaking German, 

47 



48 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

there had no fewer than five and a half miUion Germans immigrated into the 
United States between 1829 and 191 2, And as these people have multiplied 
considerably in their new and propitious surroundings, the estimate that no 
less than a quarter of the white population of the United States are either 
of German parentage or have German blood in their veins does not seem 
at all exaggerated. Certainly, the German immigration in the nineteenth 
century reaches a total considerably larger than that of any foreign element. 
As against about five million immigrants from Germany, there are three 
million nine hundred thousand from Ireland, three million from England, 
Scotland, and Wales, and one and a half million from Norway, Denmark, 
and Sweden. 

America a Refuge for Political Exiles 

Why has the United States proved so attractive especially to Germans? 
The history of the colonization of all the world shows two reasons that cause 
people to emigrate from their home country. It is not an easy thing, espe- 
cially for the more sentimental German, to give up his home, leave behind 
relatives and friends, part from the graves of parents and ancestors, and 
seek a new home in a far-away and unknown country. It is still more diffi- 
cult for a German, for while the English and Irish have at least the advan- 
tage of an identity of language, the German from the lower walks of life has 
no great facility to learn an idiom quite new to him. But the two reasons 
that bring about emigration have been stronger in Germany than in other 
countries. The first is, political and social pressure, lack of opportunity to 
develop the faculties of the mind and to take a part in the development of 
the nation. The other is the difficulties arising in making the necessary 
living, finding the necessary room for expanding and keeping together the 
family. In a word, commercial, industrial, and agricultural stagnation. 
Both these reasons have been very potent factors in bringing over such an 
enormous number of my countrymen. The nation had got a big impulse 
a hundred years ago when the crushed Germany rose as one man to drive 
out and destroy the French usurper; the greatest hopes were entertained 
for a new Germany as a result of that supreme effort. Thus when the 
diplomatists got together in 181 5 in Vienna and rearranged the map of 
Europe, all the old dynasties returned to their antiquated and autocratic 
tendencies, the dangers of the French Revolution still fresh in their minds. 
The Holy Alliance between Russia, Austria, and Prussia was formed; Ger- 
man national feeling counted for nothing, and the German country was re- 
duced to and kept in an impotent state in the form of a loose agglomeration 
directed by an assembly appointed by the rulers of some thirty German 
States ^^ithout any popular consultation. But the men who shed their 
blood for the liberation of the Fatherland, who had for years worked and 
prepared for it, and had not done it alone in order to fight an external foe, 
but also in order to increase .civic rights and national advancement, did not 
mean to be put down. So the next two decades saw a period of internal 
fight between the more liberal upper strata and the organized police power: 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 49 

reformers were being prosecuted under the name of "demagogues/' tried and 
cruelly imprisoned, and, despondent of ever attaining their ends, they sought 
a new home in that country that was peacefully, but effecti\'ely, dcA'eloping 
the policy of the freedom of n;ien. This was the first wave of intellectual 
Germany that was carried over on to these shores. And the same hap- 
pened in 1848, when a new effort to put my country on a more liberal b^asis, 
after a short and partial success, was again mulcted by those identical Powers 
of the past, a furious war being waged on all the participants in the Revo- 
lution of 1848, a great number being shot, and others being imprisoned. So, 
again, this political pressure brought another intellectual set, thirsty for 
civic liberty and wishing and willing to take an active share in the framing 
of their own destinies, to America. So it happened that these Germans did 
not only come in quest of a more liberal form of government, but they were 
already imbued with democratic ideals, and this element did not only profit 
by the existence of liberal institutions in the United States, but it did also 
greatly help and further the development of these same institutions to a 
very large degree. 

While political pressure mostly affects the more cultured upper classes, 
economic pressure invariably brings the lower classes into motion, because 
everybody tries to hold on as long as he possibly can to his old surroundings, 
and the people must, so to say, "be pressed out of the country." The point 
of least resistance will always be found with the people of small means, large 
famihes, and lesser gifts. 

Emigration Under Economic F*ressure 

All Europe suffered in the end of the 'forties under a succession of crop 
failures. Americans know how these failures especially affected Ireland, 
almost a one-crop country. The potato crops failed entirely, and as the 
dominating nation, the English, either did not care, or could not alleviate 
the distress, Ireland lost about half its population, sending it to foreign 
shores. Very much the same happened in Germany. Population increased, 
crops were poor, industrial development Avas of the lowest order, so people 
became very easily unrooted. But on the other side of the water, in America, 
the discovery'- of the gold-bearing sands of California loomed up as a glo^A-ing 
spectre on the western horizon, and during the next two decades a continual 
stream of German immigration was poured into the United States. This 
stream continued even after the excitement over the discovery of gold 
abated. W^hile the economic pressure continued in Europe, reports came 
from the settlers of earlier times of the splendid opportunities that the 
liberal land policy of the United States gave, and the extent of this move- 
ment may be gauged from the fact that in the CiA'il War no fewer than one 
hundred and seventy-seven thousand bom Germans fought on the side of 
the North — a very much larger percentage than that contributed by all 
other foreign elements. It is commonly supposed that the Irish element 
gave the largest proportion to the Union Army, but that is not so. As 



50 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

against one hundred and seventy-seven thousand German Europeans, there 
have been counted one hundred and forty-four thousand Irish. And Mr. 
Faust, in his admirable work on "The German Element in the United 
States," states that no fewer than five hundred thousand people of German 
extraction fought for the preservation of the Union. 

The Panic of 1873 

Soon after the Civil War, Bismarck brought about the German unifica- 
tion, which put at once a different aspect on the German problem. The war 
of 1870 gave an enormous impetus, both politically and economically, to 
the German people. Up to that time we felt Prussian, and Bavarian, and 
Saxon in our immediate relations to our Government. In America we were 
called fondly "Dutchmen." A nation of Germany exists only since 1870. 
But the tendency to develop, to build up economically the new em.pire, did 
not take into account that the wealth necessary for the carrying on of the 
enormous enterprises started was insufficient for the purpose. The payment 
of the billion dollars by France and the repayment out of that fund of all 
the war claims, the pouring of so much gold into the commercial arteries 
without an effective distributing organization, led to the "Krach" of 1873. 
There were no banks of sufficient strength, there was no reserve power, to 
help enterprises that got stuck. Curiously enough, at that time Germany 
was so little developed economically that the standard share in which 
everybody gambled was not a German, but an Austrian, security — the 
shares of an Austrian Credit Institute. As a consequence, a great many of 
the newly commenced industries had to be dropped. So Germany experi- 
enced an enormous reverse, and the stream of emigration had to go on. It 
took about five years to overcome this, and in 1879 a change in the policy 
of Germany took place; Bismarck going from the free-trade tack over to 
the one of a moderate protection. The influence of the teachings of America 
in that direction are unmistakable. The American theory of protecting 
infant industries by a comparatively high tariff appealed to Germany, then 
in a similar state. Germany became rapidly industrialized. It meant that 
the people could be kept at home, employed in industry, paid good wages. 
Although in the early 'eighties we have yet some such figures of emigration 
from Germany as 280,000, it very soon ceased to be of any account. Since 
1894 it has practically ceased. In 191 2 only 18,000 people emigrated, 
while, as a matter of comparison, British emigration ran as high in the 
same year as 469,000. 

German Emigration Now Stopped 

Germany is now keeping all her people busy at home. Although the 
population has risen from thirty-nine millions in 1870 to nearly seventy mil- 
lions in 1 9 14, she is even now short of hands and employing constantly 
between one and one-half million and one and three-quarter million of 
foreigners in her mines and her agriculture. Even in her colonies there 
are not more than twenty-three thousand Germans living at this time. This 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 51 

change in the industrial situation necessitated the establishment of a number 
of distributing agencies. The growth of national feeling brought now to 
the fore high-class Germans who established themselves in foreign countries, 
but in contradistinction to the former practice these men retained their 
nationality and stayed distinctly German. To distribute the enormous 
production, the establishing of a merchant marine was necessary-. Within 
forty years, German trade has increased 500 per cent, while the English 
trade has only increased 1 50 per cent. The watchword became " Efficiency." 
EfiSciency means, to do everything by the most approved methods and at 
the least cost, which could only be done by Germans becoming independent 
in shipping, insurance, and finance: all of which is now being done by 
German national houses, who have helped enormously to increase the 
wealth of the United States. But these methods were not of Germany's 
invention. They could be found in the United States and were adapted to 
German needs, and a certain kind of ''Americanization" of German business 
took place. On the other hand, the German leaning to thoroughness, a 
fortunate working together of theoretical and applied science, a thorough 
primary and technical education, helped the German mind to develop a 
number of specialties such as she must export in order to maintain her 
balance of trade. Germany is not a rich country: we are nearly independent 
from the rest of the world for our food supply, but as to raw material (except 
coal, which we have in unmeasured extent) we are dependent upon inter- 
national commerce. Copper, cotton, and oil we do not produce, and we 
have been among the best customers of the United States in cotton, and 
the best in the other two articles. If we had to pay for them in cash, we 
would very soon have come to the end of our gold resources. 

Our Friendly Trade Relations 

Since America is, even up to this date, not a creditor, but a debtor na- 
tion, she can not lend any considerable amount for any length of time to 
other countries. So we have to pay in produce, chief of all, in our chemi- 
cal products, and especially potash, of which we have a sort of monopoly. 
Then, the tendency of keeping our people at home and having them work 
in their own houses, and a certain tender feeling for the produce of our own 
hands, have developed an enormous toy industry that stands, strange to say, 
second on the list of the exports to the United States, There are, further- 
more, scientific apparatus, lithographic papers, and a host of small articles 
that are being constantly shipped, and while none of the single items making 
up the German import of the United States is more than nine million dollars 
a year, the whole of it amounts to about one hundred and sixty millions. We 
import about double that amount from the United States. One hundred and 
ten million dollars' worth of cotton, seventy-five million dollars' worth of 
copper, forty millions' worth of wheat, twenty millions' of mineral oils. So 
we are indebted to the amount of one hundred and fifty million dollars every 
year to the United States. How do we pay for that? There comes another 



52 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

interesting phase of German-American relations. I have spoken of the 
social pressure exercised in the first part of the last century, but this social 
pressiure did not only afYect Germans by race, but it was most strongly felt 
by the very enterprising Jewish element, who lacked equality of rights, and 
even after that had been given them in letter it was very often not kept in 
spirit. So this connection of social pressure, with the enormous advantages 
of the new country, caused a Jewish emigration, that formed a very valuable 
instrument for placing American securities in Germany. These people 
enjoyed the confidence of their compatriots at home, and when they recom- 
mended in 1862-3 the taking of the bonds of the North, a very large amount 
of the "seven thirty" bonds were sold in Germany. When the Pacific rail- 
roads were constructed, the bonds of the Central Pacific, of the California 
& Oregon, and Oregon & California found a large market in Germany. 
W^hen Mr. Villard (himself a German by birth) undertook the completion 
of the Northern Pacific, more than fifty million dollars of its bonds (a very 
large amount, at that time) went to Germany. The coupons of these secur- 
ities helped to make up the balance of trade, but most of it comes from 
profits of German houses, insurance premiums, the freights in American 
produce in German vessels, the remittances of Germans living in the United 
States to their home people, and other items of that character. There has 
been a constant give and take between these two countries, by which both 
of them fared extremely well. There has never been any clash of interest 
between the two peoples. There has always been an expansion of their 
mutual relations. There is, furthermore, a considerable number of Ameri- 
can industries established in Germany, The Westinghouse Brake Company 
has a factory in Hanover. The Standard Oil Company has a great organi- 
zation in our country. So has the Singer Sewing Machine Company and 
various typewriter and cash-register concerns. There is a constant inter- 
change between the great German and American electric concerns which, 
to the absolute exclusion of England, are domineering all the world. 

And with all this work on the materialistic side of life, the scientific and 
ethical sides have never been lost sight of. German and American sciences 
are constantly exchanging their newest attainments, and a great many 
American and German universities are having exchange professors. Inter- 
national conferences in both countries have always the largest contingent 
from Germany and America, and while we no longer send our intelligent 
people abroad for good, as we formerly had to do, we have surmounted all the 
difficulties in language, of the difference in the turn of mind, and now freely 
enjoy, and ungrudgingly, the great steps forward made in the United States. 

There is in the world a great community of all people of intellect — a 
great flow of thought — and a solidarity of ethics, that goes on unhampered 
vrithout respect to what happens in the outer world. And though there 
may be differences on some points, we always feel the cordiality of the 
American people in the spiritual life, and are grateful for the ties in our 
common industrial and commercial advancement. 



GERMANY'S FOOD SUPPLY 

Will the Germans Have an Ample Quantity of Bread and Meat for Armies and 
Civil Population During the Next Two Years? 

{From "The Revleic of Krdiezijs") 

[It is in compliance with the request of the Editor of this Review that Dr. Dernhnrg 
presents the interesting data upon Germany' s agriculture that will be found in the present 
article. Dr. Dernburg typifies Germany's efficient men of affairs who have built up the 
Empire' s financial and industrial strength. He is one of the foremost of Berlin's bankers, 
is a member of the upper house of the Prussian Parliament, luas for four years the Em- 
peror's Minister of Colonies, and is a man of an extraordinary range of infortnation, 
not only regarding the political, industrial, and military affairs of Germany, but also 
regarding the conflicts and rivalries of the great nations for foreign trade and colonial 
empire. — Editor Review of Reviews.] 

This is asking a ^'ery broad question and one that can not be answered 
with any degree of correctness unless the scope of the inquiry be Kmited 
as to time. I shall, therefore,- only try to give my answer for a space, say, 
of two years. But this answer also depends greatly upon the march of 
events, which may change the whole picture. I assume that Germany will 
hold on to Belgium and to the western part of Poland, but am not taking 
into consideration any foodstuffs that might be gotten from France, al- 
though it is just as likely as not that Germany will lay her hands on Havre. 

Supplies from Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium 

There is, furthermore, the question of the prisoners of war and the 
returning refugees, which might become a serious problem, if the prisoners 
of war in Germany, who number now about 300,000, should by Russian 
defeat be swollen to, say, a million. This is ciuite possible, in \iew of the 
fact that the battle at Tannenberg alone resulted in go, 000 prisoners. 
War is being waged on Germany by all her neighbors, except the three 
little States of Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland, the traffic connection 
with which can not be interrupted, and which will be under the necessit}' of 
doing a good deal of trade with Germany. 

They were regularly providing Germany, before the war, with meat, 
dairy products, fruit, barley, wheat, all of which they will continue to fur- 
nish, together with Sweden, and that the more since the chief customer for 
some of these products, namely England, has shut herself off by strewing 
the North Sea with mines. 

The same is the case with Belgium. Danish dairy products are of so 
high a quaUty that they could only be purchased in England by the rich 
class, so the ordinary traffic in vegetables, poultr\-, and butter has been 
done always between Belgium and England. This, of course, will all be 

53 



54 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

available for Germany as soon as Belgian agriculture has been built up 
again. This, by the way, is one of the things that will be done by Germany 
as soon as Belgium has been liberated entirely from her invaders. 

From Italy and Other Neighbors 

Then there is, of course, Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria. And it does not look 
— in spite of French temptation and the Hberal use of money among the 
Italian mobs by the French Ambassador — as if Italy would swerve from 
virtue. She is growing enormous quantities of vegetables, fruit, wines, 
rice, and must export it to maintain her balance of payment. Now, while 
Germany is being hampered on all sides and practically cut off from the 
sea, a great many former consumers of Italian goods are also cut off, and 
there will be a surplus to be shipped to Germany, because it can not go 
anywhere else. 

So, for instance, the eastern part of France and all of the western part 
of Russia, though I do not think that these countries will cut a very great 
figure. Then there is another factor that is very potent in an emergency 
of the present kind. No blockade, no closing of frontiers, no arrangements 
between authorities, will ever prevent the trickling through of considerable 
materials to the best payer. But that I leave entirely out of count. My 
figures are made up without regard to contraband, without regard to 
Rumanian wheat and maize, or anything else that Bulgaria may be able 
to spare, or to such wheat and maize as may come from Asia Minor, whence 
the way is absolutely open to Germany without regard to any breadstuffs 
from Italy, as I consider these items merely as offsets against such food- 
stuffs as Germany may be called upon to use in feeding a population that is 
not her own. 

By Way of Antwerp 

This population will certainly be the first to suffer. If the Allies turn 
their war on Germany into a war of starvation, they must be prepared for 
the fact that whichever Allies are in our hands will get the first show. Even 
if England should continue to prescribe to the United States what amounts 
of wheat, cotton, and other things she should sell, even if she sends the stuff 
in her own bottoms to neutral countries, she can not prevent any shipping 
in the Baltic nor regulate the overland trafific of home-grown produce of 
neutral countries; otherwise she would place herself in the position of a 
general distributer of food for half of the world, hampering not only the 
trade of the United States, but also mostly that of the small nations, which 
she would make believe to be so dear and near to her big heart. 

Besides, there may be windfalls for Germany, which England has not 
counted upon. I rather suspect that Antwerp will prove such a windfall, 
although the Allies have taken care to destroy a lot of American property 
in the oil tanks, so as to prevent their falling into the hands of the Germans. 
But then, there will be some beautiful fishing now in the Scheldt and neigh- 
boring waters, and the Dutch sole is not to be despised. Of course, there 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 55 

will be some delicacies that Germany will have to forego; for instance, 
there may be some difficulty in getting enough cocoa, but of coffee there 
are enormous amounts stored in Hamburg, and there will be no deficiency. 

German Rye and Wheat 

So the main point will be, how is Germany to provide herself with 
breadstuffs, meat, fresh vegetables, and fruit, the first two as necessities for 
life, the last as indispensable for the health of the people? Now, taking 
the average year, we can say,, counting wheat and rye together (and as 
information for the Americans I must add that rye-bread is the bread for 
Germany), there is a deficiency of a million to a million and a Cjuarter of tons 
that Germany does not raise herself, which is about 6 per cent of the total 
consumption. This will probably have to be replaced by some other food- 
stuff, and the one that is presenting itself is the potato, the average crop 
of which is about fifty million tons, but this year we have as much as 
80,000,000 tons. 

Potatoes— in Bread Form 

In the last years the art of preserving the potato has been a great problem 
in Germany. For a long time the military authorities had offered a premium 
for a good method of preserving potatoes. This premium has now been 
withdrawn, as the ciuestion can be considered as having been solved. There 
are various methods of })rcserving them. In the first place, they are being 
cut up in very small slices and dried, the same way as all the California 
dried vegetables are offered in these markets. Then they have been con- 
verted into a most nutritious flour, which has heretofore been used to 
make cake and pastry, and this will now be added to the bread up to 20 
per cent. 

Now, it must be understood that 80,000,000 tons of potatoes means just 
about a ton and a quarter per head of the German population, equivalent 
to about four pounds a day all the year round for each German, women and 
children included. This potato crop has heretofore been mostly worked into 
alcohol, partly for consumption in industries, partly for beverages. But 
there is a very determined war being conducted in Germany against alco- 
holic beverages, and no soldier has been permitted even a drink of beer 
since the first day of mobilization. 

Sugar Lands for Alfalfa 

Then, of course, the food needs of the population will always have the 
precedence over any use of alcohol in the arts. Thus there will be a large 
surplus, which will more than make up any deficiency in wheat or rye. 
But that is not all the end of it. Germany has been raising an average of 
2,500,000 tons of sugar, whereof about half is being exported. 

Now, sugar has been harvested in Germany for this year, and can not 
be exported; consequently there is a two-years' supply on hand, which would 



56 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

mean that the big acreage employed in the raising of sugar-beets is available 
for such crops as might be short. On fields which grew sugar-beets, any- 
thing else can be planted and will give big harvests. There may be some 
shortage of fodder for animals, because a great deal of that has ordinarily 
been imported. Accordingly, this sugar ground will probably be sowed 
to alfalfa and other good haymaking crops, and so there will be no diffi- 
culty on this account either. One can say, therefore, no shortage of bread- 
stuffs ought to be expected under these conditions. 

Some Beef, Ample Pork 

Americans are aware that the importation of meat into Germany has 
been partly prohibited, partly made impossible for a number of years, in 
order to give the incentive to German agriculture to raise home provisions. 
Ever since we knew that beef production was more or less monopolized, we 
have been working intensely to become independent. So at the last counting 
there were no fewer than 20,000,000 beeves, 5,000,000 sheep, 3,000,000 goats, 
and 26,000,000 hogs in Germany. By the way, there were also about 
5,000,000 horses. 

Beef takes about three years to ripen, while hogs are ready within the 
year in which they are born. This means that Germany is able to produce 
every year about 8,000,000 beef animals, 5,000,000 sheep and goats, and 
26,000,000 hogs, and with the peasants and laborers the pork is preferred 
on account of its cheapness and nutritious quality. That it makes a very 
good food everybody will agree, who has ever tasted Westphalian ham or 
Gottinger sausages. 

Food for Animals 

Therefore, provided we can feed the animals, there will always be 
enough meat, — and I do think we can manage it. There are enormous 
areas in Germany, especially in the northwestern part, that can be turned 
into hayfields at short notice. As for vegetables, we have partly to rely 
on southern Germany, Belgium, and Italy. But the chief pur^'eyor of 
late years has been Holland ; and she being cut of! from the English market, 
will yield the desired quantities. So the situation is at present entirely 
satisfactory, and the starving out of Germany will prove just as much a 
piece of British braggadocio as, for instance, Mr. Churchill's digging out 
of the German fleet on the very day of the loss of three British cruisers. 

Labor for Agriculture 

But what about the future? In the first place, the question will be that 
of farm labor. There are 66,000,000 Germans. Of these, 5,000,000 have 
been called to arms. This leaves 61,000,000. A great many industries have 
stopped, and all their hands are free. The German love for home and the 
little garden, the slice of field, and the custom of keeping at least one hog, 
make all these people familiar with agriculture. 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 57 

But then, there are now t,T) per cent of the German population engaged 
wholly in agriculture; and what about 300,000 Russian [)risoncrs and as 
many French and Belgian prisoners? These may be eniplo}-ed in such 
crafts as they understand, according to The Hague protocol. They will 
be made to work for their keeping. Besides, moreover, the large estates in 
Germany have been worked for years past by machinery run by electricity, 
all of which has been driven by water-power. 

Will War Stimulate Invention? 

So we finally come down to the question whether we have decent har- 
vests. Of course, a complete crop failure would be a serious matter for 
Germany in times of war, as well as in times of peace. But there is one el- 
ement that must not be overlooked; there is nothing that incites so much 
the inventive genius as an emergency. It is known that Germany holds 
the best fertilizers of all the world in unmeasured quantities of potash, 
and it is known also that the necessary nitrates are being obtained by 
resolving the air into its component parts by electricity. The war will 
bring out any number of devices — processes that have been too expensive 
so far in competition — which will be taken up and made more perfect. 
Products will be turned to use that have never been thought of before. 
Like a good housewife who must get along suddenly 'upon a limited stipend 
per week, because some hardship has befallen her husband, so a nation, 
convinced of its good cause, and fairly successful in arts up to the present, 
will find its way and be able to buck np against the humanitarian English 
proposal of starving it out. 



WHEN GERMANY WINS 

{From " The Independent ") 

[We have heard a great deal about what England and France are fighting for. We 
have heard very little — except from English sources — about what Germany is fighting 
for. Here is a chance to read the other side. 

Dr. Dernburg stands for what we Americans most admire in modern Germany, 
its industries, its commerce, its technical schools, and its efficient organization. When 
the Kaiser put him at the head of the Colonial Office in igoy it was a great shock to the 
Junkers, who thought that such high positions were the natural monopoly of those of 
noble lineage and resented the appointment of a business man, and, what was worse, 
a business man of American training, as successor to Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg. 
But the Kaiser was tired of the bureaucratic and military methods of administration 
in the colonies and wanted to have them developed and made self-supporting instead 
of remaining a drain on the Imperial Treasury. Herr Dernburg made a personal 
inspection of the African possessions and woidd probably have made them in time as 
profitable as the British colonies, if he had been able to carry out his program of reforms. 
In " The Independent " of Jantlury 77, igoy, will be found an account of what his 
administration meant to Germany. 

Herr Dernbtirg is the son of an editor of the Berlin " Tageblatt" and was born in 
Darmstadt fifty years ago. After graduating from the Berlin gymnasium he came to 
Netv York City in order to learn American ways, and was for some years in the banking 
house of Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co. After his return to Germany he became a director 
of the Bank of Darmstadt. He is now in this country on an important mission. Asa 
man thoroughly familiar with A merican history and politics as ivell as finance he under- 
stands our poitit of view and can interpret to us the point of view of his own country. 
Those whose enterprise has brought their country into the front rank of commercial 
nations within a single generation are better representatives of the real Germany than 
militarists or semi- Slavonic theorists. — Editor Independent.] 

What will Germany do if she is entirely victorious? This question has 
been addressed to me by a number of American friends, time and again. 
And when I said that it seemed to me premature to make any such fore- 
cast, I was met with the reply that the Allies were not so overcautious, and 
had very freely said what they intended to do to Germany and Austria if 
they got the chance. 

The most lenient of these programs runs about like this: The crushing 
of German militarism (Mr. Asquith); the destruction of the German fleet 
(Winston Churchill); the reduction of Germany to a subordinate Power, 
the breaking up of the Prussian hegemony (Lloyd-George). Of course, 
Belgium is to be restored and a large slice of German and Dutch territory 
to be added to it; Alsace-Lorraine is to be returned to France with a big 
indemnity in land on the left bank of the Rhine; the Polish provinces of 
Germany to go to Russia; Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark. And a similar 
program has been announced as regards the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 
Finally, of course, Russia is to conquer Turkey and to absorb the whole 
Ottoman Empire. In short, what is intended is to reduce Germany to the 
position she had in 1806 after the victories of Napoleon I., which would 

58 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 59 

strike her out of the list of the great nations, and would make her subordi- 
nate to the good will of the victors. 

That such a program can never be carried through, even partially, as 
long as there remain a hundred thousand Germans capable of bearing 
arms, needs not be emphasized. 

But that (in view of these acknowledged demands of the Allies) it might 
be of some interest to Americans to know what Germany would do if she 
was in the position in which the Allies love to mirror themselves, I will 
concede. 

I am speaking here as a thinking German, who knows the history of his 
country and who wishes her to profit from past experience, always keeping 
in mind that it is now the time to settle the European question for a hundred 
years to come, and to take care of the probable increase of our population, 
to secure its livelihood and prosperity. While France has remained practi- 
cally stationary in her population, the regular annual increase of the Ger- 
man people is about 800,000 souls. 

American readers who have followed Germany's development since she 
became a united empire will very easily be able to check my views by com- 
paring them with the known ambitions of my people, and drawing the 
necessary inferences from German popular, industrial, and commercial 
development. 

Territorial Expansion in Europe 

While there may be some minor corrections of frontiers for military 
purposes, by occupying such frontier territory as has proven a weak spot 
in the German armor, I do not consider it wise, nor, I believe, do the leading 
people of my country, for Germany to take any European territory. She 
is now holding practically all the land inhabited by the German-speaking 
population of the world, with the exception of the Baltic provinces of 
Russia. Whether these could be added to the German Empire would 
hinge on the question whether they could be defended. A look at the map 
will show that this must be very difficult. The lack of homogeneity has 
been a great source of trouble to all the European nations. England has 
had the. Irish trouble (which has been a very potent factor in her going 
to war). The unrest in Lorraine, and that of about thirty thousand Danes in 
the north of Schleswig, and the now past differences with several millions of 
Poles, have given my country considerable trouble. Italy is restive because 
of a few hundred thoiusand Italians incorporated into Austria. The Polish 
question is constantly occupying the Russian mind; so is the Jewish ques- 
tion, which has there more a racial than a religious character. The ardent 
desire of the Servians to redeem their brethren in Austria has given cause 
for the present war. So any rearrangement of the European map that 
would not follow national lines pretty definitely would be only a source of 
constant friction hereafter. This does not say that every single German is 
to be returned to Germany, nor every single Frenchman to France. The 



6o SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

position of Europe is, and will remain, such that the various States must 
look for defensive measures against their neighbors, and such strategic con- 
siderations should have a large share in any peace settlement. But as a 
general rule, I would not consider it wise for my country to attempt any 
territorial aggrandizement in Europe. 

The Future of Belgium 

From the foregoing it would follow that Belgium would not be made 
a German province. As events have shown, her natural position with 
respect to France and England — especially as a bulwark for the latter on 
the continental side of the Channel — has made Belgium a ^^assal of the 
two countries. As Sir Edward Grey says, he "expected" Belgium to fight 
to the last man. And fight she did, practically without help from the Allies. 
Belgium was so entangled with England by the various military "conversa- 
tions" or arrangements, such as those evidenced by the plan of Colonel 
Bernardiston, that she could not accept the German Chancellor's offer of 
integrity, indemnity, and full restoration, tendered twice — both before and 
after the fall of Liege. By accepting these offers, Belgium could have avoided 
all the misery that has since befallen her. It is her own doing that has 
placed her in her present plight. 

Geographically, Belgium does certainly belong to the German Empire. 
She commands the mouth of the biggest German stream. Antwerp is most 
essentially a German port and the main outlet of the trade of western Ger- 
many. That Antwerp should not belong to Germany is as much an anomaly 
as if New Orleans and the Mississippi delta had been excluded from the 
Louisiana Purchase, or as if New York had remained English after the 
War of Independence. 

These considerations will probably determine the German attitude. 
While no attempt is likely to be made to place Belgium within the German 
Empire alongside of the Kingdoms of Bavaria, of Wiirtemberg, and Saxony, 
because of her non-German population, the connection between Germany 
and Belgium must be strengthened by including her into the German 
customs union, as has been the case with Luxemburg ever since 1867; and, 
furthermore, the harbors of Belgium must be secured by some practical 
means against British or French invasion. That Belgian neutrality has 
been an impossibility, the past has shown, and so her state of neutrality 
will probably be lost for all time. On the other hand, such an arrangement 
would give Germany an opportunity to build up Belgium again industrially, 
agriculturally, and commercially, and Germany would probably have to 
engage to pro\dde the necessary financial aid. 

The North Sea and the Channel 

England has now bottled up the North Sea by its command of the 
British Channel. It will be necessary in future to reestablish a mare libenim 
(a free sea) . There are various means by which this could 1)e accomplished. 



SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 6i 

The English theory, that the sea is her boundary, and that all the sea is 
her territory down to the three-mile hmit of the other Powers, can not be 
tolerated. 

The neutralization of all the Channel coasts — English, Dutch, Belgian, 
and French — even in times of war, must be necessarily secured, and the 
American and German doctrine that private property on the high seas 
should enjoy the same freedom from seizure as private property does on 
land, should be guaranteed by all the nations. The importance of such a 
stipulation will be readily recognized at a time like the present, when 
England makes commercial war upon the United States on the pretence 
of protecting her interests against the nations with which she is engaged 
in a struggle. It would become equally necessary to neutralize all cables; 
their cutting has hurt the United States even more than Germany. 

The Colonies 

It must l)e demanded, as a matter of course, that all of the colonial pos- 
sessions, without exception, should be returned. But her growing popula- 
tion makes it absolutely imperative that Germany should also get some 
territory that could be populated by whites. At the present time she has 
no such colonies. In all the German possessions over the sea, in spite of 
efforts that have lasted for over thirty years, less than thirty thousand 
white people, including military, have been settled. So she must endeavor 
to get some such territory with a climate fit for her people. The Monroe 
Doctrine (which Germany has always recognized in letter as well as in 
spirit) forbids our seeking expansion on this side of the water, either in 
North or in South America. So we will have to turn to some such place 
like Morocco — if it is really fit for the purpose, which I am unable to say 
at this present time. 

Germany and Turkey 

Germany has been for about thirty-five years the associate of Turkey 
in developing Turkish territory, commerce, and industry. She has acquired 
the Oriental railways and built the AnatoKan and Bagdad lines. She has 
established harbors and shipping companies, and engaged in mining and very 
extensive irrigation works. She must demand to be left with a free hand 
to go on with this commercial de\'elopment as far as she can arrange with the 
sovereign power of the Porte and without outside interference. This 
would mean a recognized sphere of influence from the Persian Gulf to the 
Dardanelles. 

The Commerce of the World 

Germany stands, and has always stood, for the "open door and equal 
opportunity" policy, as to China and to other countries as well as to the 
British colonies, and it must be strictly maintained. All such under- 
handed proceedings as, for instance, the Japanese have resorted to, attempt- 
ing to throttle foreign commerce by the possession of the railways in Man- 



62 SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR 

churia, must be done away with, and all the Powers must see to it that no 
more parts of the earth are closed to the exclusive advantage of any one 
nation. While every nation must have an undisputed right to treat foreign 
goods and foreign immigrants as she sees fit in her own interests, every 
nation must treat all other nations in a spirit of equality and without 
discrimination. 

The Fate of the Smaller Nations 

Of course, it is incumbent upon Germany to see that such as have 
helped her in her struggle shall not be left to the mercy of her antagonists. 
The right of the peoples to frame their own destinies must be fully recog- 
nized. If the Finnish nation, which is of non-Slavic -descent, choose to 
join their Swedish brethren, we will have to stand up for them. If Poland 
has the necessary vitality, she should have a chance to show it. If the 
Boers want to be independent, they should have that right. And if Egypt 
wants to return to Turkey, she must be permitted to do so. All this must 
be done in such a way that no new dangers can arise to the dual alliance. 

There is nothing in this program that would seriously change the aspect 
of Europe. There is no wish for world-dominion or any unduly predominant 
Power in western Europe incommensurate with the mass of 122,000,000 of 
Germans and Austrians, and there is no danger to the peace of Europe. It 
is simply the carrying out of the peaceful aims that Germany has had for 
the last forty-four years — the only nation of Europe that, even in the face 
of intense provocation, has never let herself be dragged into any war, or 
has taken by force a foot of territory against the will of the owner. 

In conclusion, I will say that while I am speaking as a private person 
and can not voice in any way official sentiment, I feel sure that I am at 
one with the best German element, and that my opinions are shared by 
almost everybody in my country. My country did not wish this war, has 
done its utmost to ward it off, and is not like England, which, on her own 
testimony, stands convicted of an effort to destroy an unwelcome com- 
petitor and a people whose chief sins are diligence and thrift, and who have 
never harmed the rest of the world. The only thing Germany stands com- 
mitted to is to hold and maintain its "place in the sun." 



LIBRftRY OF CONGRES 



021 546 266 3 



